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Evenwel v. Abbott
14-940
Ruling Below: Evenwel v. Perry, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156192 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014)
In 2013, the Texas Legislature enacted a State Senate map creating districts that, while roughly
equal in terms of total population, grossly malapportioned voters. Appellants, who live in Senate
districts significantly overpopulated with voters, brought a one-person, one--vote challenge,
which the three-judge district court below dismissed for failure to state a claim. The district court
held that Appellants' constitutional challenge is a judicially unreviewable political question.
Question Presented: Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s “one-person, one-vote” principle
creates a judicially enforceable right ensuring that the districting process does not deny voters
and equal vote.
Sue EVENWEL and Edward Pfenninger
Plaintiffs
v.
Rick PERRY, in his official capacity as Governor of Texas, and Nandita Berry, in her
official capacity as Texas Secretary of State
Defendants
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division
Decided on November 5, 2014
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
MEMORANDUM
ORDER

OPINION

AND

After this case was filed raising allegations
implicating a statewide redistricting scheme,
Fifth Circuit Chief Judge Carl Stewart
appointed this three-judge panel to preside
over the case. This court has federal-question
jurisdiction. Before the court are the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. The court heard oral argument on
the motion on June 25, 2014. Also pending
are Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment

and a motion to intervene filed by the Texas
Senate Hispanic Caucus, and others. For the
following reasons we GRANT Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, we
DISMISS Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment and the motion to intervene.
I. Background
The Texas Legislature is required by the
Texas Constitution to reapportion its senate
districts during the first regular session after
the federal decennial census. It is undisputed
that, after publication of the 2010 census, the
Texas Legislature created redistricting
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PLANS148 and passed it as part of Senate
Bill 31, which Texas Governor Rick Perry
signed into law June 17, 2011. A separate
three-judge panel of the United States
District Court for the Western District of
Texas found that there was a not insubstantial
claim that PLANS148 violated the federal
Voting Rights Act, and issued an interim
plan, PLANS172, for the 2012 primary
elections. Thereafter, the Texas Legislature
adopted and Governor Perry signed into law
PLANS172, as the official Texas Senate
districting plan.
On April 21, 2014, Plaintiffs Sue Evenwel
and Edward Pfenninger filed suit against
Governor Perry and Texas Secretary of State
Nandita Berry in their official capacities.
Plaintiffs allege that they are registered
voters who actively vote in Texas senate
elections. Evenwel lives in Titus County, part
of Texas Senate District 1, and Pfenninger
lives in Montgomery County, part of Texas
Senate District 4.
Plaintiffs allege that, in enacting PLANS172,
the Texas Legislature apportioned senatorial
districts to achieve a relatively equal number
of individuals based on total population
alone. Plaintiffs concede that PLANS172’s
total deviation from ideal, using total
population, is 8.04%. The crux of the dispute
is Plaintiff’s allegation that the districts vary
widely in population when measured using
various voter-population metrics. They
further allege that it is possible to create
districts that contain both relatively equal
numbers of voter population and relatively
equal numbers of total population. They
conclude that PLANS172 violates the oneperson, one-vote principle of the Equal

Protection Clause by not apportioning
districts to equalize both total population and
voter population.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss argues that
there is no legal basis for Plaintiffs’ claim that
PLANS 172 is unconstitutional for not
apportioning districs pursuant to Plaintiffs’
proffered scheme.
II. Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” The inquiry
under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, accepting all
facts alleged in the complaint as true, the
complaint states a plausible claim for relief.
Importantly, legal conclusions need not be
accepted as true. Under Rule 12(b)(6),
dismissal is proper if a claim is based on an
ultimately unavailing legal theory.
III. Discussion
A state’s congressional-apportionment plan
may be challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause in either two ways: (1) that
the plan does not achieve substantial equality
of population among districts when measured
using a permissible population base
measured; or (2) that the plan is created in a
manner that is otherwise invidiously
discriminatory against a protected group.
Plaintiffs’ challenge falls only in the first
category, so we address that theory
Here Plaintiffs must prove that the districting
plan violates the Equal Protection Clause by
demonstrating that the plan fails to achieve
“substantial equality of population”—what
Plaintiffs refer to as the “one-person, one-
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vote” principle. Under this approach,
absolute mathematical equality is not
necessary, as some deviation is permissible in
order to achieve other legitimate state
interests. Furthermore, minor deviations,
defined as “a maximum population deviation
under 10%,” fail to make out a prima facie
case under this theory.
In applying this framework, the Supreme
Court has generally used total population as
the metric of comparison. However, the
Court has never held that a certain metric
(including total population) must be
employed as the appropriate metric. Instead,
the Court has explained that the limit on the
metric employed is that it must not itself be
the result of a discriminatory choice and that,
so long as the legislature’s choice is not
constitutionally forbidden, the federal courts
must respect the legislature’s prerogative.
Plaintiffs do not allege that the
apportionment base employed by Texas
involves a choice the Constitution forbids.
Accordingly, Texas’s “compliance with the
rule established in Reynolds v. Sims is to be
measured thereby.” Measuring it in this
manner, the Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that
demonstrate a prima facie case against Texas
under Reynolds v. Sims. The Plaintiffs do not
allege that PLANS172 fails to achieve
substantial population equality employing
Texas’s metric of total population; to the
contrary, they admit that Texas redrew its
senate districts to equalize total population,
and they present facts showing PLANS172’s
total deviation from ideal, using total
population, is 8.04%. Given that this falls
below 10%, the Plaintiffs’ own pleading
shows that they cannot make out a prima

facie case of a violation of the one-person,
one-vote principle. Accordingly, they fail to
state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this result by
relying upon a theory never before accepted
by the Supreme Court or any circuit court:
that the metric of apportionment employed
by Texas (total population) results in an
unconstitutional apportionment because it
does not achieve equality as measured by
Plaintiffs’ chosen metric-voter population.
Plaintiffs argue that their theory is consonant
with Burns, in which the Supreme Court
faced a related argument. Burns involved a
challenge to Hawaii’s apportionment on the
basis of registered-voter data. Although
Hawaii achieved substantial equality using its
chosen metric, there were large disparities
between the districts when measured using
total population. The Court began by
explaining that Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence has “carefully left open the
question what population” base was to be
used in achieving substantial equality of
population. The Court then stated that a
state’s choice of apportionment base is not
restrained beyond the requirement that it not
involve an unconstitutional inclusion or
exclusion of a protected group. The Court
explained that this amount of flexibility is left
to state legislatures because the decision
whether to exclude or include individuals
who are ineligible to vote from an
apportionment base “involves choices about
the nature of representation with which we
have been shown no constitutionally founded
reason to interfere.” In other words, it is not
the role of the federal courts to impose a
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“better” apportionment method on a state
legislature if that state’s chosen method does
not itself violate the Constitution.
Working from this starting point, the
Supreme Court highlighted the concerns
raised by using registered voters as the
apportionment base as opposed to state
citizenship or another permissible population
base. It then held that Hawaii’s
“apportionment satisfies the Equal Protection
Clause only because on this record it was
found to have produced a distribution of
legislators not substantially different from
that which would have resulted from the use
of a permissible population basis.” The
permissible population base the Supreme
Court considered in Burns was state
citizenship. The Court was careful to note
that its holding was limited to the specific
facts before it and should not be seen as an
endorsement of using registered voters as an
apportionment base.
Plaintiffs characterize Burns as the Court
“ma[king] clear that the right of voters to an
equally weighted vote is the relevant
constitutional principle and that any interest
in proportional representation must be
subordinated to that right.” Quite the
contrary, the Supreme Court recognized that
the precise question presented here—whether
to “include or exclude” groups of individuals
ineligible to vote from an apportionment
base—“involves choices about the nature of
representation” which the Court has “been
shown no constitutionally founded reason to

interfere.” Furthermore, the Supreme Court
indicated problems in using one of the
Plaintiffs’ proposed metrics—registered
voters—and ultimately measured the
constitutionality of Hawaii’s apportionment
using the permissible population base of state
citizenship. We conclude that Plaintiffs are
asking us to “interfere” with a choice that the
Supreme Court has unambiguously left to the
states absent the unconstitutional inclusion or
exclusion of specific protected groups of
individuals. We decline the invitation to do
so.
IV. Conclusion
The Plaintiffs have failed to pleas facts that
state an equal Protection Clause violation
under the recognized means for showing
unconstitutionality under that clause. Further,
Plaintiffs’ proposed theory for proving an
Equal Protection Clause violation is contrary
to the reasoning in Burns and has never
gained acceptance in the law. For these
reasons, we conclude that Plaintiffs’
complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Accordingly it is ORDERED that
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ claims against the
Defendants are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment and the
motion to intervene are DISMISSED.
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Settle Meaning of ‘One-Person OneVote’”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak
May 26, 2015
The Supreme Court agreed on Tuesday to
hear a case that will answer a long-contested
question about a bedrock principle of the
American political system: the meaning of
“one person one vote.”
The court’s ruling, expected in 2016, could
be immensely consequential. Should the
court agree with the two Texas voters who
brought the case, its ruling would shift
political power from cities to rural areas, a
move that would benefit Republicans.
The court has never resolved whether voting
districts should have the same number of
people, or the same number of eligible voters.
Counting all people amplifies the voting
power of places with large numbers of
residents who cannot vote legally, including
immigrants who are here legally but are not
citizens, illegal immigrants, children and
prisoners. Those places tend to be urban and
to vote Democratic.
A ruling that districts must be based on equal
numbers of voters would move political
power away from cities, with their many
immigrants and children, and toward older
and more homogeneous rural areas.
Such a decision, said Richard H. Pildes, a law
professor at New York University, “would be
most significant in border states, like

California, Texas, Arizona and Nevada, that
have the largest proportions of noncitizens.”
The Supreme Court over the past nearly 25
years has turned away at least three similar
challenges, and many election law experts
expressed surprise that the justices agreed to
hear this one. But since Chief Justice John G.
Roberts has led the court, it has been active
in other voting cases.
In 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder, a closely
divided court effectively struck down the
heart of the Voting Rights Act.
The new case, Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14940, concerns state and local voting districts.
But “the logic of the decision in Evenwel will
likely carry over to congressional
redistricting,” said Richard L. Hasen, a law
professor at the University of California,
Irvine.
The case, a challenge to voting districts for
the Texas Senate, was brought by two voters,
Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenninger. They
are represented by the Project on Fair
Representation, the small conservative
advocacy group that successfully mounted
the earlier challenge to the Voting Rights
Act. It is also behind a pending challenge to
affirmative action in admissions at the
University of Texas at Austin.
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In the new case, the challengers said their
voting power had been diluted. “There are
voters or potential voters in Texas whose
Senate votes are worth approximately one
and one-half times that of appellants,” their
brief said.
In a statement issued after the Supreme Court
accepted their case, Ms. Evenwel and Mr.
Pfenninger said they “hoped that the outcome
of our lawsuit will compel Texas to equalize
the number of eligible voters in each district.”
Professor Hasen said their lawsuit was in
tension with some conservative principles.
“It is highly ironic that conservatives, who
usually support respect for precedents and
states’ rights, are bringing a case that if
successful will not only upset decades-old
case law but also restrict the kind of
representation states may choose,” he said.
In November, a three-judge panel of the
Federal District Court in Austin dismissed
the case, saying that “the Supreme Court has
generally used total population as the metric
of comparison.” At the same time, the panel
said, the Supreme Court has never required
any particular standard. The choice, the panel
said, belongs to the states.
A 1964 Supreme Court decision, Reynolds v.
Sims, ruled that voting districts must contain
very close to the same number of people. But
the court did not say which people count.
Most state and local governments draw
districts based on total population. If people
who were ineligible to vote were evenly

distributed, the difference between counting
all people or counting only eligible voters
would not matter. But demographic patterns
vary widely.
Federal appeals courts have uniformly ruled
that counting everyone is permissible, and
one court has indicated that it is required.
In the process, though, several judges have
acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s
decisions provide support for both
approaches. The federal appeals court in New
Orleans said the issue “presents a close
question,” partly because the Supreme Court
had been “somewhat evasive in regard to
which population must be equalized.”
Judge Alex Kozinski, in a partial dissent from
a decision of the federal appeals court in San
Francisco, said there were respectable
arguments on both sides.
On one theory, he said, counting everyone
ensures “representational equality,” with
elected officials tending to the interests of the
same number of people, whether they are
voters or not.
On the other hand, he said, counting only
eligible voters vindicates the principle that
voters “hold the ultimate political power in
our democracy.” He concluded that the
Supreme Court’s decisions generally
supported the second view.
Even if counting only adult citizens is the
correct approach, there are practical
obstacles. “A constitutional rule requiring
equal numbers of citizens would necessitate
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a different kind of census than the one
currently conducted,” Nathaniel Persily, a
law professor at Stanford, wrote in 2011 in
the Cardozo Law Review.
For now, he said, “the only relevant data
available from the census gives ballpark
figures, at best, and misleading and confusing
estimates at worst.”
In 2001, the Supreme Court turned down an
opportunity to decide the question, in another
case from Texas.
Justice Clarence Thomas objected. “We have
never determined the relevant ‘population’
that states and localities must equally
distribute among their districts,” he wrote.
“The one-person-one-vote principle may, in
the end, be of little consequence if we decide
that each jurisdiction can choose its own

measure of population,” Justice Thomas
added. “But as long as we sustain the oneperson-one-vote principle, we have an
obligation to explain to states and localities
what it actually means.”
In the new case, the Supreme Court may
decide that states can determine for
themselves which standard to use. Even such
a ruling could have a major impact, Professor
Pildes said.
“If the court leaves it to states to decide, we
could see the politics of immigration come to
affect the politics of redistricting even more,”
he said. “State legislatures would be given a
green light to locate more power or less
power in areas that have large geographic
concentrations of noncitizens. Those areas
would have more power if the rule is equality
of residents and less power if it’s equality of
eligible voters.”
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“Only Voters Count?”
Slate
Richard Hasen
May 26, 2015
For the second time in a year, the Supreme
Court has agreed to wade into an election
case at the urging of conservatives. In both
cases it has done so despite the issue
appearing to be settled by long-standing
precedent. In a case expected to be decided
next month, Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona
Independent
Redistricting
Commission, conservatives asked the court to
bar states from using independent
redistricting
commissions
to
draw
congressional lines.
In a case the court agreed to hear Tuesday,
Evenwel v. Abbott, conservatives asked the
court to require states to draw their legislative
district lines in a particular way: Rather than
considering the total population in each
district, conservatives argue, the lines should
instead divide districts according to the
number of people registered or eligible to
vote. Most states use total population for
drawing
districts,
which
includes
noncitizens, children, felons, and others
ineligible to vote.
In both Supreme Court cases, there is great
irony in the fact that they are being brought
by conservatives, who usually claim to
respect precedents and states’ rights. The
challengers are not only asking the court to
revisit issues that seemed to be settled by
decades-old precedent. If successful, these
cases will undermine federalism by limiting

states’ rights to design their own political
systems.
A ruling favorable to conservatives in the
Evenwel case, especially if extended to
congressional redistricting, could shift more
power to Republicans, who are more likely to
live in areas with high concentrations of
voters.
The Arizona State Legislature case concerns
the question of who gets to set the rules for
congressional
redistricting.
The
Constitution’s election clause gives that
power to state “legislatures,” subject to be
overridden by Congress. The question is how
literally to take the word legislature and
whether only the state legislature qualifies.
Supreme Court precedents going back to the
beginning of the 20th century read the term
broadly to include, for instance, redistricting
plans approved by the voters. Although the
issue looked settled before the Supreme
Court took the Arizona case, there is now a
real chance the court will hold that removing
the legislature from redistricting decisions is
unconstitutional.
That decision would be unfortunate. In places
like California, for example, voters approved
independent redistricting commissions as a
way to take self-interest and partisanship out
of the redistricting process. This should be a
legitimate choice for states to make,
especially in the eyes of those committed to
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states’ rights. Yet the court may soon take
this important option off the table for
congressional districts. It may also bar the
use of voter initiatives to make other changes
in congressional elections, such as mandating
open primaries.
Perhaps even more is at stake in the Evenwel
case, from Texas. A ruling that states may not
draw legislative district lines taking total
population into account will benefit rural
voters over urban voters, and that will benefit
Republicans over Democrats. Urban areas
are much more likely to be filled with people
who cannot vote: noncitizens (especially
Latinos), released felons whose voting rights
have not been restored, and children. With
districts redrawn using only voters rather
than all people, there will be more
Republican districts.
Evenwel involves the issue of state legislature
redistricting, but you can bet that if the
challengers are successful in this case, they
will argue for the same principle to be applied
to the drawing of national congressional
districts. It is not clear whether the ruling
would apply to congressional districts,
because the one-person, one-vote principle
for congressional districts has a different
source in the Constitution (Article I) than the
14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,
which applies to state legislatures. But
logically, the two cases are likely to be
treated the same, and the result could be more
congressional districts tending Republican,
helping Republicans keep their advantage in
the U.S. House of Representatives.

In Evenwel, once again, the issue appeared to
be settled. Back in 1966 the Supreme Court
considered the issue in a case called Burns v.
Richardson, holding that Hawaii could
choose total population or total voters as its
method of drawing district lines. The court’s
point about why this was the state’s decision
celebrated the values of federalism: “The
decision to include or exclude any such group
involves choices about the nature of
representation with which we have been
shown no constitutionally founded reason to
interfere.” Although courts have periodically
been asked to revisit the question, Adam
Liptak reports that all the courts of appeal to
consider the question have ruled that total
population is a permissible basis for drawing
district lines. And it is not even clear we have
good measures of citizen population,
meaning there could be great errors in how
newly ordered redistricting following
Evenwel would be conducted. We are also not
sure if district lines would be based on the
number of actual or eligible voters, and that
alone could make a big difference.
The conservatives behind Evenwel don’t
seem bothered much by the intrusion on
states’ rights that a decision in their favor
would engender. That’s because they are
motivated more by the fact that noncitizens
are getting representation, and in their belief
that this is “diluting” the voting power of
citizens. They are the same people who
backed attacks on affirmative action at the
Supreme Court in the Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin case and successfully got the
Supreme Court to strike down a key portion
of the Voting Rights Act in the Shelby County
v. Holder case.
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It is an agenda not about states’ rights but
about getting the Supreme Court to force
states to empower conservatives and force

onto all of us the theories of representation
and power they envision.
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“Misguided Hysteria Over Evenwel v. Abbott”
SCOTUSBlog
Richard Pildes
July 30, 2015
As soon as the Court decided to hear
Evenwel, a barely suppressed anger emerged
in many quarters, on grounds of both process
and substance. On process: how dare the
Court address this issue, when a 1966
precedent seemingly settled the issue, and no
conflict existed in the lower courts, to boot.
On substance: how disturbing for the Court to
consider any change in the legal status quo,
in which states are perfectly free to define the
“one person, one vote” baseline (total
population or eligible voters) for themselves.
But on both process and substance, these
complaints and anxieties are misplaced and
misguided.

nineteenth century, for example, non-citizens
typically were given the right to vote (outside
the Northeast), as Alex Keyssar’s leading
history, The Right to Vote: The Contested
History of Democracy in the United States,
chronicles. States are not required, of course,
to extend the vote to non-citizens, but doing
so is constitutionally permissible and does
not dilute the vote of citizens, if this historical
experience provides guidance. . If states can
constitutionally include non-citizens in the
population of eligible voters, it would be
incongruous to conclude states lack similar
discretion to include them in the population
that counts for designing election districts.

The Court is right to confront this issue. And
more importantly, the most likely outcome is
that the Court will either re-affirm the status
quo or conclude that equal protection
requires states to use population, not voters,
as the measure of political equality – a
possibility almost none of the commentary,
thus far, seems to recognize.

Second, the Constitution’s text itself
recognizes the validity of basing political
representation on persons, rather than only
voters. In Article I, Section 2 of the original
Constitution, the apportionment among the
states of members to Congress was based on
the number of “persons”; when the
Fourteenth
Amendment
revised
the
apportionment provisions to reflect the end of
slavery, the same judgment was again made
that political representation of the states in
the House should be based on “the whole
numbers of persons in each State.” Indeed,
Congress specifically rejected proposals to
base apportionment on eligible voters
instead. The legitimacy of basing political
representation on population, not voters
alone, is embodied in these provisions. These
provisions might not require states to

Let’s start with the substantive issue. The
issue is whether “one person, one vote” is a
principle of “representational equality” or
one of “electoral equality.” Once the Court
fully grapples with the issue, I consider it
extremely unlikely a majority will conclude
that the constitutional metric must be voters.
Four reasons of principle and practicality, at
least, lead to this conclusion. First, states
have the power to extend even the right to
vote itself to non-citizens; in the mid-
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equalize population across districts, but they
strongly suggest using “persons” as the
relevant
baseline
is
constitutionally
permissible.
Third, the practice of all states for several
decades has been to use persons, not voters
(whether voting-age population, citizen
voting-age population, or eligible voters) as
the redistricting metric. Both at the time of
the Founding and the Fourteenth
Amendment, and throughout American
history, many states have used population as
the standard. To the extent these political
practices can “liquidate” or settle the
Constitution’s meaning, they confirm that
population is, at the least, a constitutionally
permissible metric. In addition, the fact that
states uniformly use population will make the
Court realize just how destabilizing it would
be to impose a sudden new constitutional rule
requiring states to equalize the number of
eligible voters across districts, even when
doing so creates significant inequalities in the
number of people across districts. Fourth, and
finally, is the technocratic and practical
problem: since the Census no longer asks
respondents whether they are citizens, a
constitutional requirement that states
equalize the number of eligible voters across
districts would be difficult for States and
courts to administer. Citizenship data would
have to come from the ACS rolling-survey
data sets; others have pointed out the
difficulties with basing once-a-decade
redistricting on this data (should we ever
have a system of automatic voter registration
for all eligible voters when they come of age,
this technocratic issue would evaporate).

So for all these reasons, the most interesting
question in Evenwel is not actually whether
the Constitution requires “electoral equality.”
That the Court would reach this conclusion is
highly unlikely. Once the Court rejects this
conclusion, the more interesting question is
whether the Court will remain content with
the principle that the Constitution gives the
states discretion to choose either “electoral
equality” or “representational equality” as the
proper interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Remarkably, the Court has only
focused on this substantive question at all in
one case, Burns v. Richardson (1966),
decided at the dawn of the reapportionment
revolution; Burns concluded states could
make either choice. Now that the issue is
back before the Court nearly fifty years later,
the jurisprudential issue is whether all the
developments in redistricting and votingrights law in those intervening years should
lead the Court to conclude that equal
protection requires a uniform understanding
concerning the correct population measure
that must be used. (My co-authored
casebook, The Law of Democracy, asks
whether “Burns survives the subsequent
development of voting rights law.”) If the
Court does conclude that a uniform
understanding of “equality” is required, the
most likely outcome is representational
equality – equality of the total number of
persons across districts.
The argument for a uniform understanding of
“equality” is strong, as a matter of both
constitutional principle and pragmatic
judicial implementation of the Constitution.
In the apportionment cases, the Court has
spoken eloquently many times about the
importance of political equality in designing
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districts – but equality of whom, people or
voters? If the basic principle is of such
constitutional magnitude, there is much force
to the conclusion that the Court has an
obligation to specify equality of whom, or
equality with respect to what value or
principle. The choice between electoral
equality and representational quality is not a
fine-grained technical detail of how to
implement the Equal Protection Clause. That
choice is a fundamental, categorical one
about the essential interpretation and
meaning of equal protection in the context of
designing our basic democratic institutions.
Does the clause require that all persons in a
jurisdiction (non-eligible voters as well as
voters) have roughly equal political
representation? Or does it require that all
eligible voters have a roughly equal voting
power? Those are fundamentally differentin-kind understandings of equal protection
that flow from the Court’s “one person, one
vote” jurisprudence – precisely the kind of
question, in other contexts, to which the
Court would provide the answer.
The reason the Court gave in Burns for
leaving this choice instead to state discretion
was that the decision of which groups to
include in the baseline for districting
“involves choices about the nature of
representation with which we have been
shown no constitutionally founded reason to
interfere.” But in the context of the
Reapportionment Cases, this explanation is
off-key. After all, it was the vehement
position of the dissenting Justices in these
cases, such as Justices Harlan and
Frankfurter, that the Court should not get
involved in these issues at all because to get
involved was to require the Court to choose

among competing theories of political
representation.
The Court crossed that Rubicon when it
decided that equal protection did not permit
representation to be based on geographic
units, such as towns and counties, and did
require it to be based on equal numbers of
sentient beings (people or voters). Having
completely redefined the basis of political
representation the Constitution requires, the
Court’s reticence about not wanting to
choose between competing theories of
representation when it comes to voters or
people rings hollow. Instead, Burns reads like
a tentative, interim, and transitional decision
in the early stages of working out the
meaning of the Reapportionment Cases.
Decided only two months after argument,
Burns arose with elections imminently
pending and dealt with what was only an
interim districting plan; in other words, the
stakes were low, the need for an immediate
decision pressing.
With the much fuller development of the
“one person, one vote” doctrine in the fifty
years since, it is not obvious the Court will be
comfortable with leaving states as much
discretion to choose “equality of whom” in
districting. And given the intensity of today’s
political conflicts over immigration, it is not
difficult to imagine those politics coming to
further poison redistricting, if states are free
to move back and forth between using voters
or persons as the measure of district equality.
Given how aware the Court is of the extreme
partisan polarization of our era, and how that
polarization plays out already in districting,
the Justices might conclude that strong
pragmatic reasons further support adoption of
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a uniform principle concerning district
“equality.”
The courts of appeals, in the three major
cases raising this issue, have all explained
why representational equality is the better
interpretation of the principles underlying the
“one person, one vote” doctrine. But all have
recognized that the issue is important and the
question close. In Evenwel, this issue arose
for the first time in the Court’s nondiscretionary appellate jurisdiction; the Court
was right to take the case, rather than
summarily affirm, and to give this issue the

attention it deserves. Texas, as the defendantappellee, will only ask the Court to affirm the
status quo and let Texas (and other States)
continue to have discretion to choose whether
to create district equality between persons or
voters. Texas will succeed to at least that
extent, I believe. But now that the Court will
be forced to confront these issues, the Court
might well conclude that it has an obligation
to decide whether there is a right answer to
the question under the Equal Protection
Clause of “equality of whom” and that the
better answer is equality of political
representation for all persons.
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“One Person, One Vote?”
The Atlantic
Garrett Epps
May 31, 2015
“Equality of representation in the legislature
is a first principle of liberty,” John Adams
wrote in 1776.
Most Americans would agree. But does
“equality of representation” mean equal
numbers of people—or equal numbers of
voters
That question is raised by the Court’s
decision Monday to hear the case of Evenwel
v. Abbott. Evenwel is a challenge to the Texas
Legislature’s plan for state Senate districts.
The appellants are registered voters from
Senate districts that have significantly more
eligible voters than some others. The
legislature’s districts vary from each other in
raw population by less than 10 percent; but in
their “citizen voting-age population,” or
CVAP, the variation can be as high as 50
percent.
In their appeal to the Court, the aggrieved
voters note that “in Texas, large numbers of
non-voters swell the population of certain
geographic locations.” The Cato Institute, in
a brief urging the Court to take the case, is
more specific: Evenwel is about race and
national origin. Under the current basis, the
Cato brief says, “a relatively small
constituency of eligible Hispanic voters ...
have their votes ‘over-weighted’ and ‘overvaluated,’ effectively diluting the votes of
eligible voters” in districts with fewer
Latinos.
Latino voters thus have

“disproportionate power.” Though the brief
doesn’t mention this, redrawing lines on
CVAP would produce districts that are older,
whiter, richer, and more likely to vote
Republican.
Throughout much of our history, states got to
apportion their legislatures any way they
wanted. But in a 1964 case called Reynolds v.
Sims, the Warren Court proclaimed that “as a
basic constitutional standard, the Equal
Protection Clause requires that the seats in
both houses of a bicameral state legislature
must be apportioned on a population basis.”
The Court’s explanation, however, created a
lasting confusion between population and
voters; “an individual’s right to vote for state
legislators,” it said, “is unconstitutionally
impaired when its weight is in a substantial
fashion diluted when compared with votes of
citizens living in other parts of the State.”
This and later decisions spawned the
shorthand phrase, “one person one vote.”
In a 1966 case called Burns v. Richardson,
the Court approved a temporary Hawaii
districting plan based on the number of
eligible voters; the state argued it needed to
use that basis, rather than population, because
of the large number of military personnel
moving in and out of the state. Justice
William Brennan’s majority opinion
approved Hawaii’s temporary plan “only
because” it “produced a distribution of
legislators not substantially different from
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that which would have resulted from the use
of a permissible population basis.”
Since then, the Court has formally left the
population-basis decision to each individual
state. In 2001, the Court denied review in a
case presenting this issue. Justice Clarence
Thomas dissented from that denial, arguing
that the Court should decide the issue rather
than leaving it to states. “The one-person,
one-vote principle may, in the end, be of little
consequence if we decide that each
jurisdiction can choose its own measure of
population,” he wrote.
As the Cato brief makes clear, the hidden
issue in Evenwel is Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. It forbids a state from adopting
any “standard, practice, or procedure” that
offers racial minorities “less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate
in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.” It’s hard to
generalize, but states with large Latino
populations use census figures on raw
population—including racial makeup—to
draw districts, and then look at the voting-age
population (including non-citizens) and and
CVAP to ensure they are not “diluting”
Latino political power.
As Professor
Nathaniel Persily of Stanford pointed out in
2010, current census data on citizenship is
less reliable than the census’ raw population
counts.
A constitutional rule requiring that districts
must be drawn on CVAP alone thus would
likely lead to fewer districts in which a
majority of voters are Latino.

The voters’ argument is mostly based on
phrases taken from the Court’s earlier
decisions. The text and history of the
Constitution itself don’t offer much support
for the idea that voters, not population,
should be counted as the basis of
representation.
In Article I Section 2, the framers provided
that seats the U.S. House of Representatives
would be awarded to states “according to
their respective numbers.” The “numbers”
included immigrants, women, children, and
other people ineligible to vote—lumped
together as “free persons.” There were two
exceptions to the rule: “Indians not taxed”
(meaning those living under independent
tribal governments) were not counted; and
“other persons” (meaning slaves) were
counted as three-fifths of “free persons.”
After Emancipation, there were no more
“other persons.” Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment, approved in 1868,
now provides that apportionment is to be
based on ”the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”
Population, not voting rights, again. (In 1924,
Congress granted citizenship to Native
people under tribal government; there are no
more “Indians not taxed.”)
Voting rights do appear in the Fourteenth
Amendment, however. Immediately after the
Civil War, Southern states were happy to
have representation apportioned on the basis
of the whole population of freed slaves, and
not just at three-fifths of that sum, because it
would have increased their number of House
seats and electoral votes. They also planned
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to keep the franchise all white, thereby
inflating the power of white, southern voters.
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
tried to forestall that, without using racial
terms, by providing that when the right to
vote “is denied to any of the male inhabitants
of such State, being twenty–one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any
way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime,” the states would
lose representation for the entire excluded
group. (That language has never really been
tested; by 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment
formally barred racial discrimination in
voting altogether.)

What right are we talking about? Is it the
individual person’s right to representation? In
a democratic system, leaders are elected by
voters, but once elected, they represent all the
people. Those too young to vote, those
excluded because of criminal records, and
those who are not citizens are “persons” for
equal-protection purposes. Is it the individual
voter’s right to an equal vote? Then votingage population or something like it would be
the correct basis for apportionment.

Taken together, these provisions suggest that
the basic constitutional rule of apportionment
is, as the Reynolds v. Sims Court said, raw
population. The three-fifths clause in 1787
and the “male inhabitants” clause in 1868 are
phrased as extraordinary departures from that
rule.

The real issue, though, is VRA Section Two.
It impels some states with large Latino
populations to draw districts that empower
Latino voters—so that Latinos will have the
“opportunity” to elect candidates of their
choice. That requirement was added after
congressional hearings in 1982, to provide a
remedy to minority voters against voting
procedures and districting that had the effect
of reducing their influence, whether or not
they can prove that the states intended to do
so. As a young lawyer in the Reagan
administration, Chief Justice John Roberts
expressed his dismay at this “effects test.” In
a 2006 case about “vote dilution,” Roberts
wrote a separate opinion that said, “It is a
sordid business, this divvying us up by race.”
This case might offer a chance to reduce
Section Two’s impact.

These provisions, of course, do not directly
govern the issue in Evenwel. They apply to
federal apportionment; the districts in this
case are state legislative ones. The relevant
constitutional provision, then is, the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment: “No state shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” The privileges and
immunities clause appears in the same
section; it applies to “citizens of the United
States”; equal protection, however, explicitly
applies to every “person”—white and nonwhite, immigrant and native-born, citizen and
non-citizen.

It’s not an easy question; but I think the
theory, the text, and the history favor raw
population.

There’s going to be a lot of high-minded
rhetoric about Evenwel. The real currency is
bare-knuckle politics. That’s not surprising.
Take John Adams’s fine words about

68

equality of representation, for example: He
was his native Massachusetts, a populous
state, had only one vote in the Continental
Congress, the same as tiny Delaware. To
people in Delaware, “equality” probably
meant something quite different. And ever
since Adams’s time, debates about
representation have usually been inspired by
partisan advantage, not first principles of
liberty.
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“Federal Court Rejects Latest Attempt to Create Different Classes
of Constituents through Exclusionary Redistricting”
MALDEF
November 10, 2014
Last week, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Texas dismissed Evenwel
v. Perry, a lawsuit which attempted to force
the Texas Legislature to redraw its Senate
District boundaries based on the voting
electorate rather than total population
numbers. MALDEF sought to intervene in
the case on behalf of the Texas Senate
Hispanic Caucus, five registered voters, and
a U.S. citizen minor, but the court dismissed
the case before ruling on the motion to
intervene.

Evenwell v. Perry was the second attempt to
force exclusionary redistricting in Texas.
MALDEF also intervened in the first case,
Lepak v. City of Irving, in which several
residents of Irving, Texas, sued the City of
Irving to allocate council districts based on
citizen voting age population. In both cases,
the courts held that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
allows voting districts to be based on total
population, versus citizen voting age
population.

"These repeated, pernicious attempts to
discount some persons, including large
numbers of future voting citizens, in drawing
legislative districts seek to take our country
back to the 19th century when a devil's
bargain placed a provision in our original
Constitution that counted some residents as
only three-fifths of a person," stated Thomas
A. Saenz, MALDEF President and General
Counsel. "We must work to ensure that these
purveyors of apartheid continue to face
defeat in the courtroom."

The continuous redistricting challenges that
seek
to
overturn
well-established
redistricting laws further affirm the need to
revive Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Last July, the Supreme Court ruled
unconstitutional a portion of the law used to
identify states and localities that must follow
special procedures before implementing
changes in their voting systems. These
frivolous lawsuits showcase the extent to
which certain parties will go to suppress fair
representation. MALDEF will continue to
fight for equal representation and to protect
the right to vote.
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Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission
14-232
Ruling Below: Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Ariz.
2014)
The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona held that the legislative redistricting plan for
the State of Arizona, based on the 2010 census, that was created by a state restricting
commission, did not violate the one-person, one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because the population deviations in the 10 districts submitted to the
U.S. Department of Justice as minority ability-to-elect districts were predominantly a result of
the commission's good faith efforts to achieve preclearance under the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C.S. § 1973c, which was a legitimate consideration; while partisanship might have played
some role with respect to one particular voting district, the primary motivation to achieve
preclearance was legitimate (credit Lexis Nexis).
Question(s) Presented: (1) Whether the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party
justifies intentionally creating over-populated legislative districts that results in tens of thousands
of individual voters being denied Equal Protection because their individual votes are devalued,
violating the one-person, one-vote principle; and (2) whether the desire to obtain favorable
preclearance review by the Justice Department permits the creation of legislative districts that
deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle, and, even if creating unequal districts to obtain
preclearance approval was once justified, whether this is still a legitimate justification after
Shelby County v. Holder.

Wesley W. HARRIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs
v.
ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
Filed on April 29, 2014
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs, individual voters registered in the
State of Arizona, challenge the map drawn
for state legislative districts by the Arizona

Independent Redistricting Commission for
use starting in 2012, based on the 2010
census. They argue that the Commission

71

underpopulated Democrat-leaning districts
and overpopulated
Republican-leaning
districts for partisan reasons, in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s one-person,
one-vote principle. The Commission denies
that it was driven by partisanship, explaining
that the population deviations were driven by
its efforts to comply with Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. We conclude that the
population deviations were primarily a result
of good-faith efforts to comply with the
Voting Rights Act, and that even though
partisanship played some role in the design of
the map, the Fourteenth Amendment
challenge fails.
The one-person, one-vote requirement of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require that legislative
districts have precisely equal population, but
provides that divergences must be “based on
legitimate considerations incident to the
effectuation of a rational state policy.” The
majority of the overpopulated districts in the
map drawn by the Commission were
Republican-leaning, while the majority of the
underpopulated districts leaned Democratic.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that this
correlation was no accident, that partisanship
drove it, and that partisanship is not a
permissible reason to deviate from
population equality in redistricting.
The Commission does not argue that the
population deviations came about by
accident, but it disputes that the motivation
was
partisanship.
Most
of
the
underpopulateddistricts have significant
minority populations, and the Commission
presented them to the Department of Justice
as districts in which minority groups would

have the opportunity to elect candidates of
their choice. Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act required that the Commission obtain
preclearance from the Department before its
plan went into effect. To obtain preclearance,
the Commission had to show that any
proposed changes would not diminish the
ability of minority groups to elect the
candidates of their choice. The Commission
argues that its effort to comply with the
Voting Rights Act drove the population
deviations.
For the purpose of this opinion, we assume
without deciding that partisanship is not a
legitimate reason to deviate from population
equality. We find that the primary factor
driving the population deviation was the
Commission’s good-faith effort to comply
with the Voting Rights Act and, in particular,
to obtain preclearance from the Department
of Justice on the first try. The commissioners
were aware of the political consequences of
redistricting, however, and we find that some
of the commissioners were motivated in part
in some of the linedrawing decisions by a
desire to improve Democratic prospects in
the affected districts. Nonetheless, the
Fourteenth Amendment gives states some
degree of leeway in drawing their own
legislative districts and, because compliance
with federal voting rights law was the
predominant reason for the deviations, we
conclude that no federal constitutional
violation occurred.
We do not decide whether any violations of
state law occurred. Though plaintiffs have
alleged violations of state law and the
Arizona Constitution, we decided early in the
proceedings and announced in a prior order
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that Arizona’s courts are the proper forum for
such claims. We discuss that subject further
below, at 32–33. We express no opinion on
whether the redistricting plan violated the
equal population clause of the Arizona
Constitution, whether the Commission
violated state law in adopting the grid map
with population variations rather than strict
population equality, or whether state law
prohibits adjusting legislative districts for
partisan reasons. All that we consider is
whether a federal constitutional violation
occurred.
At trial, plaintiffs focused on three districts
that they argued were not true Voting Rights
Districts and therefore could not justify
population deviations: Districts 8, 24, and 26.
Accordingly, this opinion largely focuses on
the population shifts associated with the
creation of these three districts.
I. Course of Proceedings
Plaintiffs filed this action on April 27, 2012,
and subsequently filed a First Amended
Complaint. This three-judge district court
was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2284(a). Plaintiffs sought a declaration that
the final legislative map violated both the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the
equal population requirement of the Arizona
Constitution, an injunction against enforcing
the map, and a mandate that the Commission
draw a new map for legislative elections
following the 2012 elections. Originally, not
only was the Commission a defendant in this
action, but so too were each of the five
commissioners in their official capacities.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim. In a reasoned
order, we denied the motion. Plaintiffs then
filed a Second Amended Complaint.
Prior to trial, the parties filed several motions
that the court summarily disposed of on
February 22, 2013. First, defendants moved
to stay the case pending the resolution of
state-law claims in state court, which we
denied. Defendants also moved for a
protective order on the basis of legislative
privilege, which we denied. Finally,
defendants moved for judgment on the
pleadings, asking for dismissal of the
individual commissioners as defendants and
for dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim for relief
under the equal population requirement of the
Arizona Constitution. We granted this
motion,
dismissing
the
individual
commissioners from the suit and dismissing
plaintiffs’ second claim for relief. We explain
the bases for our rulings on these motions
later in this opinion, at 28–40.
Starting March 25, 2013, we presided over a
five-day bench trial. Among other witnesses,
all five commissioners testified.
II. Findings of Fact
Most of the factual findings below, based in
large part on transcripts of public hearings
and other documents in the public record,
were not disputed at trial. Rather, what was
most controverted was what inferences about
the Commission’s motivation we should
draw from the largely undisputed facts. We
discuss that issue, whether and to what extent
partisanship motivated the Commission, at
the end of this section, at 23–28.
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To the extent any finding of fact should more
properly be designated a conclusion of law, it
should be treated as a conclusion of law.
Similarly, to the extent any conclusion of law
should more properly be designated a finding
of fact, it should be treated as a finding of
fact.
A. The Approved Legislative Redistricting
Plan
The first election cycle using the legislative
map drawn by the Commission took place in
2012. Arizona has thirty legislative districts,
each of which elects two representatives and
one senator. The following chart summarizes
pertinent electoral results and population
statistics for the Commission’s 2012
legislative map, which we explain in greater
detail below.
In the 2012 elections, Republicans won a
total of 36 out of the 60 house seats, winning
both seats in 17 districts and 1 seat in 2
districts. Democrats won the remaining 24
house seats, winning 2 seats in 11 districts
and 1 seat in 2 districts. Republicans won 17
out of 30 senate seats, and Democrats won
the remaining 13. The Democratic senate
candidate narrowly won in District 8, but the
Republican candidate might have won if not
for the presence of a Libertarian candidate in
the race.3 In all, 16 districts elected only
Republicans to the state legislative houses, 11
districts elected only Democrats, and 3
districts elected a combination of
Republicans and Democrats.
Ideal population is the average per-district
population, or the population each district
would have if population was evenly

distributed across all districts. Of the 16
districts that elected only Republicans to the
state legislature, 15 were above the ideal
population and 1 was below. Of the 11
districts that elected only Democrats to the
state legislature, 2 were above the ideal
population and 11 were below. District 8 was
below ideal population, and the other 2
districts that elected legislators from both
parties were above ideal population.
Of the 10 districts the Commission presented
to the Department of Justice as districts in
which minority candidates could elect
candidates of their choice, or “ability-to-elect
districts,” all 10 only elected Democrats to
the state legislature in 2012. Nine out of ten
of these ability-to-elect districts were below
the ideal population, and one was above.
Of the 9 districts presented to the Department
of Justice as districts in which Hispanics
could elect a candidate of their choice, all but
District 24 elected at least one Hispanic
candidate to the state legislature in the 2012
elections. In District 26, only one of the three
legislators elected in 2012 was of Hispanic
descent. Of the 27 state legislators elected in
the purported ability-to-elect districts, 16
were of Hispanic descent.
District 7 was presented to the Department of
Justice as a district in which Native
Americans could elect candidates of their
choice, and it elected Native American
candidates in all three of its state legislative
races.
Maximum population deviation refers to the
difference, in terms of percentage deviation
from the ideal population, between the most
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populated district and the least populated
district in the map. In the approved legislative
map, maximum population deviation was 8.8
percent; District 12 had the largest
population, at 4.1 percent over the ideal
population, and District 7 had the smallest
population, at 4.7 percent under the ideal.
B. Formation of the Commission
In 2000, Arizona voters amended the state
constitution by passing Proposition 106, an
initiative removing responsibility for
congressional and legislative redistricting
from the state legislature and placing it in the
newly established Independent Redistricting
Commission. Five citizens serve on the
Commission, consisting of two Republicans,
two Democrats, and one unaffiliated with
either major party. Selection of the
commissioners begins with the Arizona
Commission
on
Appellate
Court
Appointments, which interviews applicants
and creates a slate of ten Republican
candidates, ten Democratic candidates, and
five independent or unaffiliated candidates.
Four commissioners are appointed from the
party slates, one by each of the party leaders
from the two chambers of the legislature.
Once appointed, those four commissioners
select the fifth commissioner from the slate
of unaffiliated candidates, and the fifth
commissioner also serves as the commission
chair.
Pursuant to these requirements, Republican
commissioners Scott Freeman and Richard
Stertz were appointed by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate,
respectively, and Democratic commissioners
Jose Herrera and Linda McNulty were

appointed by the House Minority Leader and
Senate Minority Leader, respectively.
Commissioners Freeman, Stertz, Herrera,
and McNulty then interviewed all five
candidates on the unaffiliated slate.
In his interview notes, Commissioner Stertz
noted his concerns with the liberal leanings
of most of the candidates on the unaffiliated
list. For example, he wrote that Kimber
Lanning’s fundraising efforts were almost all
for Democrats, and that her Facebook page
indicated a fondness for Van Jones. Paul
Bender, another candidate, served on the
board of the ACLU. Margaret Silva identified
Cesar Chavez as her hero, and her Facebook
profile picture featured her alongside Nancy
Pelosi, the Democratic leader in the U.S.
House of Representatives. Ray Bladine was
his first choice for the position, whom Stertz
described as balanced despite Bladine’s
former tenure as chief of staff for a
Democratic mayor. In a public meeting, the
four commissioners unanimously selected
Colleen Mathis as the fifth commissioner and
chairwoman. In his interview notes
Commissioner Stertz described her as
balanced, though noting that she and her
husband
had
supported
Democratic
candidates. Mathis and her husband had also
made contributions to Republican candidates.
C. Selection of Counsel and Mapping
Consultant
The Commission has authority to hire legal
counsel to “represent the people of Arizona
in the legal defense of a redistricting plan,” as
well as staff and consultants to assist with the
mapping process. The selection of the
Commission’s counsel and mapping
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consultant sparked public controversy, and
plaintiffs argue that the process reflected a
partisan bias on the part of Chairwoman
Mathis.
The previous Commission, after the 2000
census, had retained a Democratic attorney
and a Republican attorney. Chairwoman
Mathis expressed interest in hiring one
attorney instead of two, as the counsel hired
would represent the entire Commission. The
other four commissioners preferred to hire
two attorneys with different party affiliations,
however. That is what the Commission
decided to do.
The Commission used the State Procurement
Office to help retain counsel and interviewed
attorneys from six law firms. Among the
interviewees were the two attorneys who had
worked for the previous Commission: Lisa
Hauser, an attorney with the firm of
Gammage & Burnham and a Republican, and
Michael Mandell, an attorney with the
Mandell Law Firm and a Democrat. Other
attorneys interviewed by the Commission
included Mary O’Grady, a Democrat with
Osborn Maledon, and Joe Kanefield, a
Republican with Ballard Spahr. Osborn
Maledon and Ballard Spahr received the
highest scores from the Commission based
on forms provided by the State Procurement
Office for use in the selection process.
Nonetheless,
Commissioner
Herrera
expressed a preference for retaining Mandell
as Democratic counsel, and Commissioners
Stertz and Freeman preferred Hauser and
Gammage & Burnham as Republican
counsel.

In a public meeting, Commissioner Herrera
moved to retain Osborn Maledon and Ballard
Spahr at Chairwoman Mathis’s suggestion.
Commissioner Herrera later explained that
while Mandell was his first choice, Osborn
Maledon and Ballard Spahr received the
highest evaluation scores. Commissioner
Freeman expressed his preference for
Gammage & Burnham, and said he would
give deference to the Democratic
commissioners’ preference for Democratic
counsel if they would do the same for the
Republican commissioners. Commissioner
Stertz then made a motion to amend, to
instead retain the Mandell Law Firm and
Gammage & Burnham. The amendment was
defeated on a 2-3 vote, with Commissioners
Stertz and Freeman voting for it and
Commissioners Mathis, Herrera, and
McNulty voting against. The motion to retain
Osborn Maledon and Ballard Spahr carried
with a 3-2 vote, with Commissioners Mathis,
Herrera, and McNulty voting for the motion
and Commissioners Stertz and Freeman
voting against. The Commission thus
selected a Republican attorney for whom
neither of the Republican commissioners
voted.
In selecting a mapping consultant, the
Commission initially worked with the State
Procurement Office. An applicant for the
position had to submit, among other things,
an explanation of its capabilities to perform
the work, any previous redistricting
experience, any partisan connections, and a
cost sheet. In the initial round of scoring, each
applicant was scored on a 1000-point scale.
Each commissioner independently filled out
a scoring sheet, which considered capability
to do the work but not cost, rating each

76

applicant on a 700-point scale. The State
Procurement Office rated each applicant on a
300-point scale, 200 points of which
evaluated the relative cost of the bid.
The Commission considered the first round
of scoring, and then announced a short list of
four firms that it would interview for the
mapping consultant position. Those firms
were
Strategic
Telemetry,
National
Demographics, Research Advisory Services,
and Terra Systems Southwest. National
Demographics, which had served as mapping
consultant for the previous Commission, had
received the highest score in the first round of
evaluations.
The Commission interviewed the four
selected firms in a public meeting. During the
interview of the head of National
Demographics,
Commissioner
Herrera
expressed concern that there was a perception
that the firm was affiliated with Republican
interests. National Demographics had
worked for both Democratic and Republican
clients, though more Republicans than
Democrats. In interviewing Strategic
Telemetry, Commissioners Freeman and
Stertz asked whether, because Strategic
Telemetry had worked for a number of
Democratic clients but no Republican clients,
the firm would be perceived as biased.
After these interviews, the commissioners
conducted a second round of scoring before
selecting a firm. In this round of scoring,
Commissioners Mathis, Herrera, and
McNulty all gave Strategic Telemetry a
perfect score. Strategic Telemetry came out
of this round with the highest overall score.
Prior to the public meeting in which the

Commission voted to retain a mapping
consultant, Chairwoman Mathis made a
phone call to Commissioner Stertz and asked
him to support the choice of Strategic
Telemetry.
The
Commission
selected
Strategic
Telemetry as the mapping consultant on a 32 vote, with Commissioners McNulty,
Herrera, and Mathis voting in favor, and
Commissioners Freeman and Stertz voting
against. Before the vote, Commissioners
Freeman and Stertz had expressed a
preference for National Demographics.
At subsequent meetings, the Commission
heard extensive criticism from members of
the public about the selection of Strategic
Telemetry. Much of the criticism related to
the Democratic affiliations of the firm and to
the fact that it was based out of Washington,
D.C., rather than Arizona. Strategic
Telemetry was founded primarily as a
microtargeting firm, which uses statistical
analyses of voter opinions to assist political
campaigns. Ken Strasma, president and
founder of Strategic Telemetry, considered
himself a Democrat, as did most of the other
employees of the firm. The firm had worked
for
Democratic,
independent,
and
nonpartisan campaigns, but no Republican
campaigns. While Strasma had redistricting
experience in more than thirty states before
he founded the firm in 2003, the firm itself
had no statewide redistricting experience at
the time of its bid, nor any redistricting
experience in Arizona. Also making Strategic
Telemetry a controversial choice was that it
had submitted the most expensive bid to the
Commission. All of this was known to the
Commission when Strategic Telemetry was
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selected as the mapping consultant for the
Commission and when Commissioners
Mathis, Herrera, and McNulty each gave
Strategic Telemetry a perfect score of 700
points during the second round of scoring.
D. The Grid Map
The Commission was required to begin the
mapping process by creating “districts of
equal population in a grid-like pattern across
the state.” The Commission directed its
mapping consultant to prepare two
alternative grid maps. Believing that the
Arizona
Constitution
intended
the
Commission to begin with a clean slate,
several commissioners expressed interest in
having an element of randomness in the
generation of the grid map. The Commission
decided, after a series of coin flips, that the
consultant would generate two alternative
grid maps, one beginning in the center of the
state and moving out counterclockwise, and
the other with districts starting in the
southeast corner of the state, moving inwards
clockwise.
After the two maps were presented, the
Commission voted to adopt the second
alternative. The grid map selected had a
maximum
population
deviation—the
difference between the most populated and
least populated district—of 4.07 percent of
the average district population.
E. Voting
Requirement

Rights

Act

Preclearance

During the redistricting cycle at issue,
Arizona was subject to the requirements of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Before a
state covered by Section 5 can implement a

redistricting plan, the state must prove that its
proposed plan “neither has the purpose nor
will have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color.”
The state must either institute an action with
the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that the
plan has no such purpose or effect, or, as the
Commission did here, submit the plan to the
U.S. Department of Justice. If the Justice
Department does not object within sixty days,
the plan has been precleared and the state
may implement it.
A plan has an impermissible effect under
Section 5 if it “would lead to a retrogression
in the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise.” A redistricting plan
leads to retrogression when, compared to the
plan currently in effect, the new plan
diminishes the ability of minority groups to
“elect their preferred candidates of choice.”
There is no retrogression so long as the
number of ability-to-elect districts does not
decrease from the benchmark to the proposed
plan.
A district gives a minority group the
opportunity to elect the candidate of its
choice not only when the minority group
makes up a majority of the district’s
population (a majority-minority district), but
also when it can elect its preferred candidate
with the help of another minority group (a
coalition district) or white voters (crossover
districts). A minority group’s preferred
candidate need not be a member of the racial
minority. “Ability to elect” properly refers to
the ability to elect the preferred candidate of
Hispanic voters from the given district, which
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is not necessarily the same thing as the ability
to elect a Hispanic candidate from that
district, though there is obvious overlap
between those two concepts.
In determining the ability to elect in districts
in the proposed and benchmark plan, the
Department of Justice begins its review of a
plan submitted for preclearance by analyzing
the districts with current census data. The
analysis is a complex one relying on more
than just census numbers, however, and does
not turn on reaching a fixed percentage of
minority population. Rather, the Department
looks at additional demographic data such as
group voting patterns, electoral participation,
election history, and voter turnout.
Several aspects of the preclearance process
encourage states to do more than the bare
minimum to avoid retrogression. First, state
officials do not know exactly what is required
to achieve preclearance. As explained above,
the Department of Justice relies on a variety
of data in assessing retrogression, rather than
assessing a fixed goal that states can easily
ascertain. Bruce Cain, an expert in Voting
Rights Act compliance in redistricting who
served as a consultant to the Commission
following the 2000 census and was retained
for this lawsuit by the current Commission,
testified at trial that the lack of clear rules
creates “regulatory uncertainty” that forces
states “to be cautious and to take extra steps.”
Moreover, the preclearance process with
respect to any particular plan is generally an
opaque one. When the Department of Justice
objects to a plan, the state receives an
explanation of the basis for the objection.
When the Department does not object, by

contrast, the state receives no such
information. In other words, the state does
not know how many benchmark districts the
Department believed there were nor how
many ability-to-elect districts the Department
concluded were in the proposed plan. Nor
does it know whether the new plan barely
precleared or could have done with fewer
ability-to-elect districts.
Consultants and attorneys hired by a state to
assist with the preclearance process may also
tend to encourage taking additional steps to
achieve preclearance. The professional
reputation of a consultant gives him a strong
incentive to ensure that the jurisdictions he
advises
obtain
preclearance.
The
Commission, for example, asked applicants
to serve as its mapping consultant whether
they had previously worked with states in
redistricting and whether those jurisdictions
had succeeded in gaining preclearance on the
first try.
These factors may work together to tilt the
board somewhat because they encourage a
state that wants to obtain preclearance to
overshoot the mark, particularly if it wants its
first submission to be approved. Because it is
not clear where the Justice Department will
draw the line, there is a natural incentive to
provide a margin of error or to aim higher
than might actually be necessary. Attorneys
and consultants, aware that their professional
reputations may be affected, can be
motivated to push in that direction.
The Arizona Commission early in the process
identified obtaining preclearance on its first
attempt as a priority. All of the
commissioners, Democrats and Republicans
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alike, shared this goal. In prior decades,
Arizona had never obtained preclearance
from the Department of Justice for its
legislative redistricting plan based upon its
first submission. The Commission was aware
that, among other consequences, failure to
preclear would make Arizona ineligible to
bail out as a Section 5 jurisdiction for another
ten years. Although the Commission
considered and often adjusted lines to meet
other goals, it put a priority on compliance
with the Voting Rights Act and, in particular,
on obtaining preclearance on the first
attempt.
F. The Draft Map
After adopting a grid map, the Commission
was directed by the Arizona Constitution to
adjust the map to comply with the United
States Constitution and the federal Voting
Rights Act. It was also instructed to adjust the
map, “to the extent practicable,” to comply
with five other enumerated criteria: (1)
equality of population between districts; (2)
geographic compactness and contiguity; (3)
respect for communities of interest; (4)
respect for visible geographic features, city,
town and county boundaries, and undivided
census tracts; and (5) competitiveness, if it
would “create no significant detriment to the
other goals.” The map approved by the
Commission after the first round of these
adjustments was only a draft map, which was
required to undergo public comment and a
further round of revisions before final
approval.
Before beginning to adjust the grid map, the
Commission received presentations on the
Voting Rights Act from its attorneys, its

mapping consultant, and its Voting Rights
Act consultant Bruce Adelson. Adelson
previously worked for the Department of
Justice, where he led the team that had
reviewed and objected to the first legislative
map submitted by Arizona for preclearance
in 2002. Adelson gave the Commission an
overview of the preclearance process. He
explained that determining whether a
minority population had the ability to elect
was a complex analysis that turned on more
than just the percentage of minorities in a
district. He explained, for example, that in
reviewing Arizona’s submission from the
prior decade, the Department had found a
district where it concluded that minorities
had an ability to elect even though they made
up only between 30 and 40 percent of the
population.
Adelson
informed
the
Commission at that time that he believed the
2002 map that was ultimately approved had
nine districts in which minorities had an
ability to elect their preferred candidates.
Because the preclearance process focused on
making sure there was no retrogression, that
number was the benchmark, meaning that the
new plan had to achieve at least the same
number of ability-to-elect districts.
One of the most important factors the
Department of Justice considers in
determining the ability to elect in a district is
its level of racial polarization, which is a
measure of the voting tendencies of whites
and minorities in elections pitting a white
candidate against a minority candidate. A
racial polarization study is a statistical
analysis of past election results to determine
the level of racial polarization in a district.
When it first started considering potential
benchmark districts, the Commission did not

80

have any formal racial polarization analysis
at its disposal and relied primarily on
demographic data from the 2010 census. The
Commission eventually retained Professor
Gary King, a social scientist at Harvard
University
recommended
by
the
Commission’s counsel, to conduct a racial
polarization analysis.
Until the Commission had a formal racial
polarization analysis, it often used what it
called the “Cruz Index” to assess whether
voters in an area might support a Hispanic
candidate. Devised by Commissioners
McNulty and Stertz, the Cruz Index used data
from the 2010 election for Mine Inspector, a
statewide race pitting Joe Hart, a Republican,
non-Hispanic white (or Anglo) candidate,
against Manuel Cruz, a Democrat, Hispanic
candidate. The Cruz Index, sometimes
described by commissioners and staff as a
“down and dirty” measure, was not intended
to be the Commission’s only analysis of
cohesion in minority voting in proposed
districts, but rather a rough proxy until the
Commission had formal racial polarization
analysis. In the end, however, the voting
pattern estimates derived from the Cruz
Index wound up corresponding closely to the
voting pattern estimates King derived from
his formal statistical analysis.
To explore possible adjustments to the grid
map, the commissioners could either direct
the mapping consultant to create a map with
a certain change or use mapping software to
make changes themselves. They referred to
these maps as “what if” maps because the
maps simply showed possible line changes
that the Commission might choose to
incorporate into the draft map. Willie

Desmond was the Strategic Telemetry
employee with primary responsibility for
assisting commissioners with the mapping
software or creating “what if” maps at their
direction.
The Commission originally operated on the
assumption that it had to create nine abilityto-elect districts, based on Adelson’s report
that there were nine benchmark districts. As
a result, the earliest “what if” maps focused
on creating nine minority ability-to-elect
districts. Commissioner Freeman, for
example, directed Desmond to create several
maps that would create nine ability-to-elect
districts.
Soon, however, the Commission began
considering the possibility that there might be
ten benchmark districts. Counsel advised that
there were some districts without a majorityminority population that had a history of
electing minority candidates, such as District
23 from the 2002 legislative map. Counsel
further explained that, even though there
were seven majority-minority benchmark
districts and two to three other districts where
minorities did not make up the majority, they
nonetheless might be viewed as having the
ability to elect. Because it was uncertain how
many benchmark and ability-to-elect districts
the Department of Justice would determine
existed, counsel advised that creating ten
districts would increase the odds of getting
precleared on the first attempt.
The Commission worked to make Districts
24 and 26 ones in which, despite lacking a
majority of the population, Hispanics could
elect candidates of their choice. At this point,
the Commission was still relying on the Cruz
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Index to predict minority voting patterns in
proposed districts. As the Commission
explored shifting boundaries to create abilityto-elect districts, their mapping consultant
apprised the Commission of the effects of the
shifts on various statistics, such as minority
voting population, the Cruz Index, and the
deviation from average district population.
Counsel advised the Commission that some
population disparity was permissible if it was
a result of compliance with the Voting Rights
Act.
On October 10, 2011, the Commission
approved a draft legislative map on a 4-1
vote, with all but Commissioner Stertz voting
in favor of the map. That map had ten districts
identified by the Commission as minority
ability-to-elect districts.
G. The Effort to Remove Chairwoman Mathis
The Arizona Constitution prescribes at least
a thirty-day comment period after the
adoption of the draft map. The Commission
did not begin working on the final map until
late November, however, because of a delay
resulting from an effort to remove
Chairwoman Mathis from the Commission.
On October 26, Governor Janice Brewer sent
a letter to the Commission alleging it had
committed “substantial neglect of duty and
gross misconduct in office” for, among other
things, the manner in which it selected the
mapping consultant. On November 1, the
Governor’s office informed Chairwoman
Mathis that it would remove her from the
Commission
for
committing
gross
misconduct in office, conditioned upon the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Arizona

Senate. The Arizona Constitution permits the
governor to remove a member of the
Commission, with concurrence of two-thirds
of the Senate, for “substantial neglect of
duty” or “gross misconduct in office.” After
the Senate concurred in the removal of
Chairwoman Mathis in a special session, the
Commission petitioned the Arizona Supreme
Court for the reinstatement of Chairwoman
Mathis on the basis that the Governor had
exceeded her authority under the Arizona
Constitution. On November 17, that court
ordered the reinstatement of Chairwoman
Mathis, concluding that the Governor did not
have legal cause to remove her.
H. The Final Map
On November 29, the Commission began
working to modify the draft map to create the
final map it would submit to the Department
of Justice. Because of the delay caused by the
effort to remove Chairwoman Mathis, the
Commission felt under pressure to finalize its
work in time to permit election officials and
prospective candidates to prepare for the
2012 elections, knowing that the
preclearance process would also take time.
The Commission received a draft racial
polarization voting analysis prepared by King
and Strasma. According to the draft analysis,
minorities would be able to elect candidates
of their choice in all ten proposed ability-toelect districts in the draft map.
The Commission received advice from its
attorneys and consultants as to the
importance of presenting the Department of
Justice with at least ten ability-to-elect
districts. Adelson said that, based on the
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information he had received since his earlier
assessment, he believed the Department
would conclude that there were ten
benchmark districts. He also emphasized
that, due to the uncertainty in determining
what constitutes a benchmark district, the
Department might determine there were more
benchmark districts than what the
Commission had concluded. Counsel advised
the Commission that it would be “prudent to
stay the course in terms of the ten districts
that are in the draft map and look to . . .
strengthen them if there is a way to strengthen
them.”
The Commission also received advice that it
could use population shifts, within certain
limits, to strengthen these districts. Adelson
advised
the
Commission
that
underpopulating minority districts was an
acceptable tool for complying with the
Voting Rights Act, so long as the maximum
deviation remained within ten percent.
According to Adelson, underpopulating
districts to increase the proportion of
minorities was an “accepted redistricting
tool” and something that the Department of
Justice looked at favorably when assessing
compliance with Section 5. According to
Strasma, underpopulation could strengthen
the districts in several ways. First, it could
increase the percentage of minority voters in
a district. Second, it could account for
expected growth in the Hispanic districts,
which
might
otherwise
become
overpopulated in the decade following the
implementation of a new map.
The Commission directed Strasma and
Adelson to look for ways to strengthen the
ability-to-elect districts and report back. At a

subsequent meeting, Strasma, Adelson, and
Desmond presented a number of options for
improving the districts along with the tradeoffs associated with those changes. Strasma
identified Districts 24 and 26 in particular as
districts that might warrant further efforts to
strengthen the minority ability to elect. Doing
so would increase the likelihood that the
Department of Justice would recognize those
districts as ability-to-elect districts and thus
the likelihood that the plan would obtain
preclearance.
The Commission adopted a number of
changes to Districts 24 and 26, including
many purportedly aimed at strengthening the
minority population’s ability to elect.
Between the draft map and final map, the
Hispanic population in District 24 increased
from 38.6 percent to 41.3 percent, and the
Hispanic voting-age population increased
from 31.8 percent to 34.1 percent. In District
26, the Hispanic population increased from
36.8 percent to 38.5 percent, and the Hispanic
voting-age population increased from 30.4
percent to 32 percent.
A consequence of these changes was an
increase in population inequality. District
24’s population decreased from 0.2 percent
above the ideal population to 3 percent
below. District 26’s population increased
from 0.1 percent above the ideal population
to 0.3 percent above.
Commissioner McNulty asked Desmond to
explore possibilities for making either
District 8 or 11 more competitive. Desmond
presented an option to the Commission that
would have made District 8 more
competitive. The Republican commissioners
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expressed opposition to the proposed change.
Commissioner Stertz argued that the change
favored Democrats in District 8 while
“hyperpacking” Republicans into District 11.
Commissioner Freeman argued that
competitiveness should be applied “fairly and
evenhandedly” across the state rather than
just advantaging one party in a particular
district. The Republican commissioners were
correct that the change would necessarily
favor Democratic electoral prospects given
that the voter registration in the existing
versions of both Districts 8 and 11 favored
Republicans and that Commissioner
McNulty did not propose any corresponding
effort to make any Democratic-leaning
districts more competitive. Commissioner
McNulty was absent from the meetings in
which these initial discussions occurred, but
Commissioner
Herrera
noted
that
competitiveness was one of the criteria the
Commission was required to consider and
expressed support for the change.

another possible ability-to-elect district could
be helpful because District 26 was not as
strong of an ability-to-elect district as the
other districts.

Commissioner McNulty asked Desmond to
try a few other ways of shifting the lines
between Districts 8 and 11, one of which
would have kept several communities with
high minority populations together in District
8. Commissioner McNulty, noting that the
area had a history of having an opportunity to
elect, raised the possibility that the change
might also preserve that opportunity.
Adelson opined that, if the minority
population of District 8 were increased
slightly, the Commission might be able to
present it to the Department of Justice as an
eleventh opportunity-to-elect district, which
would “unquestionably enhance the
submission and enhance chances for
preclearance.” Counsel suggested that having

The Commission voted 3-2 to implement
Commissioner McNulty’s proposed change
into the working map and send it to Dr. King
for further analysis, with the Republican
commissioners voting against. This was the
only change order that resulted in a divided
vote.

District 8 contained many of the same
concentrations of minority populations as the
district identified as District 23 in the
previous decade’s plan. The comparable
district in that region of the state had a history
of electing minority candidates prior to the
2002 redistricting cycle. In 2002, the
Department of Justice identified that district
as one of the reasons why the Commission
did not obtain preclearance of its first
proposed plan in that cycle. Although the
Commission later argued to the Department
of Justice in its 2012 submission that the
minorities could not consistently elect their
candidate of choice in that district between
2002 and 2012, several minority candidates
had been elected to the state legislature from
the district in that time period.

This change order also affected the
population count of Districts 11, 12, and 16.
The order changed the deviation from ideal
population from 1.5 percent to -2.3 percent in
District 8, from 1.9 percent to 0.3 percent in
District 11, from 1.7 percent to 4.3 percent in
District 12, and from 1.9 percent to 4.8
percent in District 16. Because of subsequent
changes, the population deviations in these
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districts in the final map was -2.2 percent for
District 8, 0.1 percent for District 11, 4.1
percent for District 12, and 3.3 percent for
District 16. Therefore, the change in
population deviation for each district that is
both
attributable
to
Commissioner
McNulty’s change order and that actually
remained in the final map was an increase in
deviation of 0.7 percent for District 8, a
decrease in deviation of 1.6 percent for
District 11, an increase of 2.4 percent for
District 12, and an increase in deviation of 1.4
percent for District 16.
These changes increased the percentage of
Hispanic population in District 8 from 25.9
percent in the draft map to 34.8 percent in the
final map, with Hispanic voting-age
population from 22.8 percent to 31.3 percent.
The Commission ultimately concluded,
however, that while District 8 came closer to
constituting a minority ability-to-elect
district than the previous District 23, it did
not ensure minority voters the ability to elect
candidates of their choice. The changes were
nonetheless retained in the final map.
The Commission approved the final
legislative map on January 17, 2012, on a 32 vote, with the Republican commissioners
voting against.
On February 28, 2012, the Commission
submitted its plan to the Department of
Justice for preclearance purposes. In its
written submission, the Commission argued
that the benchmark plan contained seven
ability-to-elect districts, comprised of one
Native American district and six Hispanic
districts. The Commission argued that the
new map was an improvement over the

benchmark plan, as the new map contained
ten districts (one Native American district
and nine Hispanic districts) in which a
minority group had the opportunity to elect
the candidate of its choice. The Commission
also noted that while District 8 was not an
ability-to-elect district, its performance by
that measure was improved over its
predecessor, Benchmark District 23.
On April 26, the Department of Justice
approved the Commission’s map.
I. The Motivation for the Deviations
As noted previously and explained in more
detail below, at 41–44, we conclude as a
matter of law that the burden of proof is on
plaintiffs. To prevail, plaintiffs must prove
that the population deviations were not
motivated by legitimate considerations or,
possibly, if motivated in part by legitimate
considerations,
that
illegitimate
considerations predominated over legitimate
considerations. We assume that seeking
partisan advantage is not a legitimate
consideration, and we conclude, as discussed
at 44–49, that compliance with the Voting
Rights Act is a legitimate consideration.
We find that plaintiffs have not satisfied their
burden of proof. In particular, we find that the
deviations in the ten districts submitted to the
Department of Justice as minority ability-toelect districts were predominantly a result of
the Commission’s good-faith efforts to
achieve preclearance under the Voting Rights
Act. Partisanship may have played some role,
but the primary motivation was legitimate.
With respect to the deviations resulting from
Commissioner McNulty’s change to District
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8 between the draft map and the final map,
we find that partisanship clearly played some
role. We also find, however, that legitimate
motivations to achieve preclearance also
played a role in the Commission’s decision to
enact the change to District 8.
We acknowledge that it is difficult to separate
out different motivations in this context. That
is particularly true in this instance because
the cited motivations pulled in exactly the
same direction. As a practical matter,
changes that strengthened minority abilityto-elect districts were also changes that
improved the prospects for electing
Democratic candidates. Those motivations
were not at cross purposes. They were
entirely parallel.
The Cruz Index, used by the commissioners
in considering changes to the map aimed at
strengthening minority districts, illustrates
the overlap of these two motivations. It
applied results from an election contest
between a Hispanic Democrat and a white,
non-Hispanic (Anglo) Republican. The
commissioners used votes for candidate Cruz
to reflect a willingness to vote for a Hispanic
candidate—which was itself a proxy for the
ability of the Hispanic population to elect its
preferred candidate, regardless of that
candidate’s ethnicity—but the voters could
have been motivated, as much or even more,
to vote for a Democrat. Similarly, voters who
voted for Cruz’s opponent may have been
willing to vote for a Hispanic candidate but
were actually motivated to vote for a
Republican. In using the Cruz Index to adjust
district boundaries in order to strengthen the
minority population’s ability to elect its
preferred candidate, the commissioners used

a measure that equally reflected the ability to
elect a Democratic candidate.
The practical correlation between these two
motivations was confirmed by the results of
the 2012 election, conducted under the map
that is the subject of this lawsuit.
The legislators elected from districts
identified by the Commission as minority
ability-to-elect districts were all Democrats.
As noted above, 19 of the 30 legislators
elected from those districts were Hispanic or
Native American.
It is highly likely that the members of the
Commission were aware of this correlation.
Individuals sufficiently interested in
government and politics to volunteer to serve
on the Commission and to contribute
hundreds of hours of time to the assignment
would be aware of historic voting patterns. If
they weren’t aware before, then they would
necessarily have become aware of the strong
correlation between minority ability-to-elect
districts and Democratic-leaning districts in
the course of their work.
That knowledge could open the door to
partisan motivations in both directions. If an
individual member of the Commission were
motivated to favor Democrats, that could
have been accomplished under the guise of
trying to strengthen minority ability-to-elect
districts. Similarly, a member motivated to
favor Republicans could have taken
advantage of the process to concentrate
minority population into certain districts in
such a way as to leave a larger proportion of
Republicans in the remaining districts.
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Recognizing the difficulty of separating these
two motivations, we find that the
Commission was predominantly motivated
by a legitimate consideration, in compliance
with the Voting Rights Act.
All five of the commissioners, including the
Republicans, put a priority on achieving
preclearance from the Department of Justice
on the first try. To maximize the chances of
achieving that goal, the Commission’s
counsel and consultants recommended
creating ten minority ability-to-elect districts.
There was not a partisan divide on the
question of whether ten districts was an
appropriate target.
After working to create ten such districts in
the draft map, including Districts 24 and 26,
all but Commissioner Stertz voted for the
draft map. Commissioner Stertz’s reason for
voting against the draft map, however, was
not that he objected to the population
deviations resulting from the creation of the
ability-to-elect districts. Rather, he felt that
the Commission had not paid sufficient
attention to the other criteria that the Arizona
Constitution requires the Commission to
consider, such as keeping communities of
interest together.
In short, the bipartisan support for the
changes leading to the population deviations
in the draft map undermines the notion that
partisanship, rather than compliance with the
Voting Rights Act, was what motivated those
deviations.
We also find that the additional population
deviation in these ten districts resulting from
changes occurring between the passage of the

draft map and the final map were primarily
the result of efforts to obtain preclearance,
some reservations by the Republican
commissioners notwithstanding. After the
draft map was completed, both Republican
commissioners expressed concern about
further depopulating minority ability-to-elect
districts. At the hearing in which the
Commission began work on the final map,
Commissioner Stertz said that it was his
“understanding that the maps as they are
currently drawn do meet [the Voting Rights
Act] criteria,” and that he didn’t want to
“overpack Republicans into Republican
districts . . . all being done on the shoulders
of strengthening [Voting Rights Districts].”
Commissioner
Freeman
shared
Commissioner Stertz’s concerns.
But the Commission’s counsel and
consultants responded that there was
uncertainty as to whether the map would
preclear without strengthening those districts.
And despite their initial reservations, the
Republican commissioners did not vote
against any of the change orders further
strengthening the minority ability to elect in
those districts. Commissioner Stertz even
expressed support for these changes. In a
public hearing that took place after the
Commission made additional changes to the
Voting Rights Act districts, Commissioner
Stertz said that apart from a change order
affecting Districts 8 and 11—which were not
ability-to-elect districts and which we discuss
next—he was “liking where the map has
gone” and thought there was “a higher level
of positive adjustments that have been made
than the preponderance of the negative
design of Districts 8 and 11.” At trial,
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Commissioner Stertz testified that he relied
on counsel’s advice that ten benchmark
districts were necessary, and that he thought
those ten districts were “better today than
when they were first developed in draft
maps.” The bipartisan support for the goal of
preclearance, and the bipartisan support for
the change orders strengthening these ten
districts to meet that goal, support the finding
that preclearance motivated the deviations.
We make this finding despite plaintiffs’
contention that the selection of counsel and
mapping consultant prove that Chairwoman
Mathis was biased towards Democratic
interests. We agree that giving Strategic
Telemetry a perfect score is difficult to justify
and reflects Mathis taking an ends oriented
approach to the process to select her preferred
firm, Strategic Telemetry.
But even if Chairwoman Mathis preferred
Strategic Telemetry for partisan reasons
rather than the neutral reasons she expressed
at the time, it would not prove that
partisanship was the reason she supported the
creation of ability-to-elect districts. As we
have discussed, strong evidence shows that
preclearing on the first attempt was a goal
shared by all commissioners, not just
Chairwoman Mathis.
With respect to the changes to District 8
occurring between the draft map and final
map, the evidence shows that partisanship
played some role. Though Commissioner
McNulty first presented the possible changes
to Districts 8 and 11 as an opportunity to
make District 8 into a more competitive
district, that simply meant making District 8
into a more Democratic district. Because

Districts 8 and 11 both favored Republicans
before the proposed change, any shift in
population between the two districts to make
one of them more “competitive” necessarily
increased the chances that a Democrat would
win in one of those districts. In fact, in a close
senate race in the newly drawn District 8, the
Democrat did win. We might view the issue
differently had Commissioner McNulty
proposed to create a series of competitive
districts out of both Democrat- and
Republican-leaning districts, or applied some
defined standards evenhandedly across the
state. Instead, she sought to make one
Republican-leaning district more amenable
to Democratic interests. Moreover, the
Commission was well aware of the partisan
implications of the proposed change before
adopting it. Both Republican commissioners
made their opposition to the change, on the
basis that it packed Republican voters into
District 11 to aid Democratic prospects in
District 8, known early on.
Nonetheless, while partisanship played a role
in the increased population deviation
associated with changing District 8, so too
did the preclearance goal play a part in
motivating the change. While Commissioner
McNulty originally suggested altering
Districts 8 and 11 for the sake of
competitiveness, she subsequently suggested
that District 8 could become an ability-toelect district. Consultants and counsel
endorsed this idea, in part because they had
some doubts that District 26 would offer the
ability to elect. It was not until after the
consultants and counsel suggested pursuing
these changes for the sake of preclearance
that Chairwoman Mathis endorsed the idea.
While the Commission ultimately concluded
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that it could not make a true ability-to-elect
district out of District 8, the submission to the
Department of Justice did cite the changes
made to that district’s boundaries in arguing
that the plan deserved preclearance.
Compliance with the Voting Rights Act was
a substantial part of the motivation for the
treatment of District 8.
III. Resolution of Pretrial Motions
The parties filed several motions prior to trial
that this court disposed of summarily in its
order dated February 22, 2013, with an
opinion explaining the bases of the rulings to
follow. Before we turn to our conclusions of
law on the merits of the case, we explain our
rulings on those motions.
A. First Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings
Defendants’ first motion for judgment on the
pleadings sought two forms of relief. First,
defendants requested dismissal of the
commissioners
based
on
legislative
immunity. Second, defendants requested
dismissal of plaintiffs’ state-law claim as
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We now
explain why both forms of relief were
granted.
1. Standard of Judgment on the Pleadings
Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate
when there is “no issue of material fact in
dispute, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” In assessing
defendants’ motion, we “accept[ed] all
factual allegations in the complaint as true
and construe[d] them in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.”

2. The Commissioners Were Immune from
Suit
It was not entirely clear from the complaint
but
plaintiffs’
claims
against
the
commissioners appeared to be based solely
on the commissioners’ official acts. That is,
plaintiffs’
claims
rested
on
the
commissioners’ actions in connection with
the adoption of a particular final legislative
map. Plaintiffs’ federal claim sought relief
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on their
belief that the adoption of that map
constituted a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Commission argued
legislative immunity forbade plaintiffs from
pursuing
this
claim
against
the
commissioners.
“The Supreme Court has long held that state
and regional legislators are absolutely
immune from liability under § 1983 for their
legislative acts.” This immunity applies to
suits for money damages as well as requests
for injunctive relief. Litigants often disagree
over whether legislative immunity applies to
a particular individual or to particular acts
performed by an individual occupying a
legislative office. But plaintiffs effectively
conceded the commissioners qualified as
legislators performing legislative acts. So
instead of the normal lines of attack,
plaintiffs argued that Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), prevented legislative
immunity from requiring dismissal of the
commissioners. Plaintiffs also claimed their
request for attorneys’ fees permitted them to
maintain suit against the commissioners.
Neither argument was convincing.
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Ex parte Young creates a legal fiction to avoid
suits against state officials from being barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. That fiction
permits only “actions for prospective
declaratory or injunctive relief against state
officers in their official capacities for their
alleged violations of federal law.” Plaintiffs
did not cite any case where a court employed
the fiction of Ex parte Young to avoid the
otherwise applicable bar of legislative
immunity. And existing case law reaches the
opposite conclusion. Thus, Ex parte Young
was not sufficient to overcome the bar of
legislative immunity.
Even if the court had agreed Ex parte Young
might permit the naming of the
commissioners in certain circumstances, it
was particularly inapt here. Pursuant to Ex
parte Young, the “state official sued ‘must
have some connection with the enforcement
of the act.’” That connection must be “fairly
direct” and a “generalized duty to enforce
state law or general supervisory power over
the persons responsible for enforcing the
challenged provision” is not sufficient.
Accordingly, Ex parte Young does not allow
a plaintiff to sue a state official who cannot
provide the relief the plaintiff actually seeks.
Under Arizona’s redistricting process, the
commissioners have no direct connection to
implementing the final legislative map nor do
they have any supervisory power over those
state officials implementing the final
legislative map. Rather, it is the Secretary of
State who enforces the map. Plaintiffs named
the Secretary of State as a defendant and the
Secretary of State conceded he is responsible
for enforcing the map. In light of this,
assuming Ex parte Young allows suit against

the commissioners in some circumstances,
the present suit did not qualify.
Finally, plaintiffs argued the commissioners’
“presence [was] essential to maintaining
section 1983 relief, which includes an award
of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”
In other words, plaintiffs wanted to keep the
commissioners as defendants to ensure the
possibility of plaintiffs recovering their
attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs did not cite, and the
court could not find, any authority permitting
the issue of fees to determine the propriety of
keeping certain defendants in a suit.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ issue regarding fees
was a problem of their own creation in that
the Secretary of State undoubtedly was an
appropriate defendant and plaintiffs could
have sought fees from him. At oral argument,
however, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded the
complaint did not seek an award of fees from
the Secretary of State. The fact that plaintiffs
made a choice not to seek fees against one
party from whom they could clearly obtain
fees was not a sufficient basis to allow
plaintiffs to continue this suit against
inappropriate parties.
Neither Ex parte Young nor the impossibility
of plaintiffs collecting fees from the
remaining defendants justified keeping the
commissioners as defendants. Therefore, the
commissioners were entitled to judgment on
the pleadings.
3. Plaintiff’s State-Law Claim Was Barred by
the Eleventh Amendment
In addition to their § 1983 claim, plaintiffs
also asserted a state-law claim that the final
legislative map “violates the equal population
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requirement of Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2,
§1(14)(B).” Defendants moved to dismiss
this state-law claim as barred by the Eleventh
Amendment pursuant to Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman. Plaintiffs
did not dispute that a straightforward
application of Pennhurst established their
state-law claim was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Instead, plaintiffs argued
defendants
waived
their
Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Plaintiffs were
incorrect.
“For over a century now, [the Supreme
Court] has consistently made clear that
‘federal jurisdiction over suits against
unconsenting States was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the
judicial power of the United States.’” A state
may choose to waive its immunity, but the
“test for determining whether a State has
waived its immunity from federal-court
jurisdiction is a stringent one.” That test
consists of determining whether “the state’s
conduct during the litigation clearly
manifest[ed] acceptance of the federal court’s
jurisdiction or [was] otherwise incompatible
with an assertion of Eleventh Amendment
immunity.” For example, the Ninth Circuit
concluded waiver occurred when a state
appeared, actively litigated a case, and waited
until the first day of trial to claim immunity.
The situation in the present case was
significantly different.
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on
April 27, 2012. The parties then engaged in
protracted pre-answer maneuvers that ended
on November 16, 2012, when the court
denied defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Approximately three weeks later, defendants

filed their answer asserting Eleventh
Amendment immunity as well as a formal
motion seeking judgment on the pleadings
based on that immunity. Thus, while the case
had been pending for over nine months at the
time immunity was first asserted, the vast
majority of that time was consumed by
briefing and deciding a motion to dismiss.
There was no meaningful delay between
issuance of the order on the motion to dismiss
and defendants’ assertion of the Eleventh
Amendment. And while defendants might
have raised immunity earlier, the actual
sequence of events falls short of meeting the
“stringent” test for establishing waiver.
Therefore, defendants were entitled to
judgment on the pleadings regarding
plaintiffs’ state-law claim.
B. Motion for Abstention
Citing Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co., defendants moved to stay this
case and defer hearing plaintiffs’ federal
claim until plaintiffs obtained resolution of
state-law issues in state court or, in the
alternative, to certify any state-law questions
to the Arizona Supreme Court. A majority of
the court summarily denied the motion, with
Judge Silver dissenting.
Because “Congress imposed the duty upon
all levels of the federal judiciary to give due
respect to a suitor’s choice of a federal forum
for the hearing and decision of his federal
constitutional claims,” Pullman abstention is
available only in narrowly limited, special
circumstances. At its core, it “reflect[s] a
doctrine of abstention appropriate to our
federal system whereby the federal courts,
‘exercising a wise discretion,’ restrain their
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authority because of ‘scrupulous regard for
the rightful independence of the state
governments’ and for the smooth working of
the federal judiciary.” “It is better practice, in
a case raising a federal constitutional or
statutory claim, to retain jurisdiction, rather
than to dismiss.” Pullman abstention
generally is appropriate only if three
conditions are met: (1) the complaint
“requires resolution of a sensitive question of
federal constitutional law; (2) the
constitutional question could be mooted or
narrowed by a definitive ruling on the state
law issues; and (3) the possibly determinative
issue of state law is unclear.”
Proper application of these conditions is
meant to ensure federal courts defer “to state
court interpretations of state law” while
avoiding
“‘premature
constitutional
adjudication’ that would arise from
‘interpreting state law without the benefit of
an authoritative construction by state
courts’.”
When deciding whether to exercise its
discretionary equity powers to abstain, a
court also must consider that “abstention
operates to require piecemeal adjudication in
many courts,” possibly “delaying ultimate
adjudication on the merits for an undue
length of time.” That delay can work
substantial injustice because forcing “the
plaintiff who has commenced a federal action
to suffer the delay of state court proceedings
might itself effect the impermissible chilling
of the very constitutional right he seeks to
protect.”
Delay caused by abstention is especially
problematic in voting rights cases. The Ninth

Circuit noted in a redistricting case that due
to the “special dangers of delay, courts have
been reluctant to rely solely on traditional
abstention principles in voting cases.”
Expressing specific concern about the
possibility of a potentially defective
redistricting plan being left in place for an
additional election cycle, it held that “before
abstaining in voting cases, a district court
must independently consider the effect that
delay resulting from the abstention order will
have on the plaintiff’s right to vote.”
Given the importance of prompt adjudication
of voting rights disputes, we exercised our
discretion and decided not to abstain. The
three conditions precedent to applying
Pullman abstention identified above might
have been present here, but we concluded that
we should deny the motion without having to
make that determination because of the likely
delay that would have resulted.
If we abstained as defendants requested, it
was not likely that a resolution could be
reached in time to put a new plan in place, if
necessary, for the 2014 election cycle. Not
only are voting rights disputes particularly
important, they are also particularly complex.
The last round of litigation over redistricting
in Arizona, concerning Arizona’s legislative
redistricting maps following the 2000 census,
commenced in March 2002. The state trial
court did not issue its decision until January
2004, twenty-two months later. The appellate
process did not conclude until the Arizona
Supreme Court’s final decision in May 2009.
The Commission’s motion for abstention
came before us in December 2012. At the
time of our decision on the motion, in
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February 2013, no state court action was
pending. Thus, deferring ruling on the federal
claim would have delayed adjudication on
the merits until a state court action was
initiated and concluded, which likely would
have precluded relief in time for the 2014
election cycle.

presence of a state-law question that “may be
determinative” of the case. With the
dismissal of plaintiffs’ state-law claim, there
was no pending issue of Arizona law in this
case. Therefore, the request in the alternative
for certification also was denied.
C. Motion for Protective Order

Furthermore, we could not resolve the statelaw issues as this case no longer included the
state-law claim because the State of
Arizona’s Eleventh Amendment immunity
under Pennhurst precluded relief on that
claim in federal court. And, it was also
unclear whether any state law issues were
implicated in plaintiffs’ remaining federal
claim. In sum, this case is unlike the typical
case warranting Pullman abstention, where
the federal court will necessarily construe a
state statute that the state courts themselves
have not yet construed in order to decide the
sensitive question of whether the state statute
violates the federal Constitution. Here, by
contrast, we did not need to resolve any
question of state law as a predicate to
deciding the merits of the federal claim.
Therefore, we concluded that the special
circumstances necessary for exercising
discretion to defer ruling on plaintiffs’
federal claim did not exist.
As an alternative to their request for
abstention, defendants requested the court
certify any state-law questions to the Arizona
Supreme Court. A basic prerequisite for a
court to certify a question to the Arizona
Supreme Court is the existence of a pending
issue of Arizona law not addressed by
relevant Arizona authorities. In addition,
Arizona’s certification statute requires the

Prior to discovery, the Commission moved
for a protective order on the basis of
legislative privilege. The Commission
requested that the panel prohibit the
depositions of the commissioners, their staff,
and their consultants, as well as limit the
scope of documents and interrogatories
during discovery. We ordered the
commissioners, at the time defendants in this
case, to inform the court through counsel
whether they would exercise legislative
privilege if asked questions covered by the
privilege. Commissioners Mathis, Herrera,
and McNulty informed the court that they
would invoke legislative privilege, while
Commissioners Freeman and Stertz indicated
they would waive it. We later denied the
motion for a protective order, and we now
explain the basis for doing so.
Whether members of an independent
redistricting commission can withhold
relevant evidence or refuse to be deposed on
the basis of legislative privilege is an issue of
first impression. Neither the Ninth Circuit
nor, as far as we can tell, any other court has
decided whether members of an independent
redistricting
commission
can
assert
legislative privilege in a challenge to the
redistricting plan they produced. In the
present litigation, we conclude that members
of the Arizona Independent Redistricting
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Commission cannot assert a legislative
evidentiary privilege.
State legislators do not have an absolute right
to refuse deposition or discovery requests in
connection with their legislative acts. In
United States v. Gillock, the Supreme Court
held that a state senator could not bar the
introduction of evidence of his legislative
acts in a federal criminal prosecution.
Although Gillock could have claimed
protection under the federal Speech or
Debate Clause had he been a Member of
Congress, the Court refused “to recognize an
evidentiary privilege similar in scope to the
Federal Speech or Debate Clause” for state
legislators. The Court reasoned that
“although principles of comity command
careful consideration, . . . where important
federal interests are at stake, as in the
enforcement of federal criminal statutes,
comity yields.” The Court in Gillock held that
no legislative privilege exists in federal
criminal prosecutions. It did not opine on the
existence or extent of legislative privilege for
state legislators in the civil context.
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that state
legislators and their aides may be protected
by a legislative privilege. That case did not
consider legislative privilege in the
redistricting context, however, let alone
whether citizen commissioners could assert
the privilege. Moreover, its discussion of
legislative privilege was limited. The
decision did not indicate whether state
legislators might assert an absolute
legislative privilege in all civil litigation, or
whether any privilege state legislators held
must yield when significant competing
interests exist.

Whether or not state legislators might be able
to assert in federal court an absolute
legislative privilege in some circumstances,
we do not think that the citizen
commissioners here hold an absolute
privilege. The Fourth Circuit has recognized,
albeit not specifically in any redistricting
cases, a seemingly absolute privilege against
compulsory evidentiary process for state
legislators and other officials acting in a
legislative capacity. The purposes underlying
an absolute privilege for state legislators are
that it “allows them to focus on their public
duties by removing the costs and distractions
attending lawsuits [and] shields them from
political wars of attrition in which their
opponents try to defeat them through
litigation rather than at the ballot box.”
However, these are not persuasive reasons for
extending the privilege to appointed citizen
commissioners. Unlike legislators, the
commissioners have no other public duties
from which to be distracted. They cannot be
defeated at the ballot box because they don’t
stand for election. Indeed, the process is not
supposed to be governed by what happens at
the ballot box. The reason why Arizona
transferred redistricting responsibilities from
the legislature to the Commission was to
separate the redistricting process from
politics.
In addition, to the extent comity is a rationale
underlying legislative privilege, the Supreme
Court has held that comity can be trumped by
“important federal interests.” The federal
government has a strong interest in securing
the equal protection of voting rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, an interest
that can require the comity interests
underlying legislative privilege to yield.
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For similar reasons, we also refuse to extend
a qualified legislative privilege to the
commissioners in this case. Some courts have
recognized a qualified privilege for state
legislators in redistricting cases, in which a
balancing test determines whether particular
evidence is barred by the privilege. These
cases did not involve an independent
redistricting commission, however, and
several of these cases even suggested that a
legislative privilege would not apply to
citizen commissioners.
In determining whether a qualified privilege
applies to state legislators, the courts that
recognize a qualified privilege often balance
the following factors: “(i) the relevance of the
evidence sought to be protected; (ii) the
availability of other evidence; (iii) the
‘seriousness’ of the litigation and the issues
involved; (iv) the role of the government in
the litigation; and (v) the possibility of future
timidity by government employees who will
be forced to recognize that their secrets are
violable.” These factors weigh heavily
against recognizing a privilege for members
of an independent redistricting commission.
Because what motivated the Commission to
deviate from equal district populations is at
the heart of this litigation, evidence bearing
on what justifies these deviations is highly
relevant. In the event that plaintiffs’ claims
have merit, and that the commissioners were
motivated by an impermissible purpose, the
commissioners would likely have kept out of
the public record evidence making that
purpose apparent.
Perhaps most importantly, the nature and
purpose of the Commission undermines the
claim that allowing discovery will chill future

deliberations by the Commission or deter
future commissioners from serving. The
commissioners will not be distracted from
other duties because they have no other
duties, and their future actions will not be
inhibited because they have no future
responsibility. And, as the majority in
Marylanders observed: “We . . . deem it
extremely unlikely that in the future private
citizens would refuse to serve on a
prestigious gubernatorial committee because
of a concern that they might subsequently be
deposed in connection with actions taken by
the committee.”
The parties dispute the relevance of some of
plaintiffs’ requested discovery. But to the
extent that plaintiffs have requested
information not relevant to the central
disputes in this litigation, the Commission
need not rely on legislative privilege for
protection. As stated in our order dated
February 22, 2013, the court will not permit
“discovery that is not central to the federal
claims or any other inappropriate burden
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).”
In conclusion, the rationale supporting the
legislative privilege does not support
extending it to the members of the Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission in
this case.
IV. Conclusions of Law
A. Burden of Proof
The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that state
legislative districts “must be apportioned on
a population basis,” meaning that the state
must “make an honest and good faith effort
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to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal
population as is practicable.” Some deviation
in the population of legislative districts is
constitutionally permissible, so long as the
disparities are based on “legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of
a rational state policy.” Compactness,
contiguity, respecting lines of political
subdivisions, preserving the core of prior
districts, and avoiding contests between
incumbents are examples of the legitimate
criteria that can justify minor population
deviations, so long as these criteria are
“nondiscriminatory”
and
“consistently
applied.”
Before requiring the state to justify its
deviations, plaintiffs must make a prima facie
case of a one-person, one-vote violation. By
itself, the existence of minor deviations is
insufficient to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination.
With respect to state legislative districts, the
Supreme Court has said that, as a general
matter, a “plan with a maximum population
deviation under 10% falls within this
category of minor deviations.” Although
courts rarely strike down plans with a
maximum deviation of less than ten percent,
a maximum deviation below ten percent does
not insulate the state from liability, but
instead merely keeps the burden of proof on
the plaintiff.
Because the maximum deviation here is
below ten percent, the burden is on plaintiffs
to prove that the deviations did not result
from the effectuation of legitimate
redistricting policies. The primary way in
which plaintiffs seek to carry their burden is

by showing that the Commission deviated
from perfect population equality out of a
desire to increase the electoral prospects of
Democrats at the expense of Republicans.
Plaintiffs argue that partisanship is not a
legitimate redistricting policy that can justify
population deviations.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether
or not political gain is a legitimate state
redistricting tool. Because we conclude that
the redistricting plan here does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment whether or not
partisanship is a legitimate redistricting
policy, we need not resolve the question. For
the purposes of this opinion, we assume,
without deciding, that partisanship is not a
valid justification for departing from perfect
population equality.
Even assuming that small deviations
motivated by partisanship might offend the
Equal Protection Clause, plaintiffs will not
necessarily sustain their burden simply by
showing that partisanship played some role.
The Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed what a plaintiff must prove in a
one-person, one-vote challenge when
population deviations result from mixed
motives, some legitimate and some
illegitimate.
This panel has not reached a consensus on
what the standard should be. We conclude,
for purposes of this decision, that plaintiffs
must, at a minimum, demonstrate that
illegitimate criteria predominated over
legitimate criteria.
Finally, we reject plaintiffs’ argument that
strict scrutiny applies to the extent that the
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Commission claims that racial motivations
drove the deviations from population
equality. All of the cases cited in support of
this argument involve racial gerrymandering
claims. As plaintiffs concede, this is not a
racial gerrymandering case. Nor have
plaintiffs specifically articulated how, in the
absence of a claim of racial discrimination,
strict scrutiny helps their case. Suppose that,
applying strict scrutiny, we concluded that
the Commission employed race as a
redistricting factor in a manner not narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling
governmental interest. That may establish a
racial gerrymandering violation, but it would
not establish a one-person, one-vote
violation. We decline to reduce plaintiffs’
burden by importing strict scrutiny into the
one-person, one-vote context, a context in
which the Supreme Court has made clear we
owe state legislators substantial deference.
In sum, plaintiffs must prove that the
deviations were not motivated by legitimate
considerations or, if motivated in part by
legitimate considerations, that illegitimate
considerations predominated over legitimate
considerations. Because we have found that
the deviations in the Commission’s plan were
largely motivated by efforts to gain
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act, we
turn next to whether compliance with Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act is a permissible
justification for minor population deviations.
B. Compliance with the Voting Rights Act as
a Legitimate Redistricting Policy
The Supreme Court has not specifically
spoken to whether compliance with the
Voting Rights Act is a redistricting policy

that can justify minor population deviations.
The Court has not provided an exhaustive list
of permissible criteria. Among the legitimate
criteria it has approved are compactness,
contiguity, respecting municipal lines,
preserving the cores of prior districts, and
avoiding contests between incumbents. In the
context of racial gerrymandering cases, the
Court has assumed, without deciding, that the
Voting Rights Act is a compelling state
interest.
We conclude that compliance with the
Voting Rights Act is among the legitimate
redistricting criteria that can justify minor
population deviations. If compliance with the
Voting Rights Act is not a legitimate, rational
state policy on par with compactness and
contiguity, we doubt that the Court would
have assumed in Vera that it is a compelling
state interest. Neither plaintiffs nor the
dissenting opinion have offered a sensible
explanation.
More importantly, we fail to see how
compliance with a federal law concerning
voting rights—compliance which is
mandatory for a redistricting plan to take
effect—cannot justify minor population
deviations when, for example, protecting
incumbent legislators can. This is, perhaps,
our primary disagreement with the dissenting
opinion. It too narrowly defines the reasons
that may properly be relied upon by a state to
draw state legislative districts with wider
variations in population.
The dissenting opinion correctly notes, at 19–
20, that states are required to establish
congressional districts of essentially equal
population. It acknowledges, as it must, that

97

state legislative districts are not subject to as
strict a standard. A state legislative plan may
include some variation in district population
in pursuit of legitimate interests.
The dissenting opinion also acknowledges, at
17 & 23, that obtaining preclearance under
the Voting Rights Act was a legitimate
objective in redistricting. But it contends that
pursuit of that objective could not justify
even minor variations in population among
districts. In practical terms, the dissenting
opinion would apparently permit the
Commission to consider the preclearance
objective only in drawing lines dividing
districts of equal sizes.
The Supreme Court has made it clear,
however, that states have greater latitude
when it comes to state legislative districts.
The Equal Protection Clause does not require
exact equality. In drawing lines for state
legislative districts, “[a]ny number of
consistently applied legislative policies
might justify some variance.” Obtaining
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act
appears to us to be as legitimate a reason as
other policies that have been recognized,
such as avoiding contests between
incumbents and respecting municipal lines.
Plaintiffs and the dissenting opinion, at 19,
attempt to reframe the inquiry, arguing that
the text of the Voting Rights Act itself does
not specifically authorize population
deviations. That is correct; there is no
specific authorization for population
deviations in the text of the legislation. But
neither is there specific, textual authorization
for population deviations in any of the other
legitimate, often uncodified legislative

policies that the Supreme Court has held can
justify population deviations. For example,
the Supreme Court’s conclusion that
compactness
can
justify
population
deviations does not turn on the existence of a
Compactness Act that specifically authorizes
population deviations for the sake of compact
districts. The question is not whether the
Voting Rights Act specifically authorizes
population deviations, but whether seeking
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act is a
legitimate, rational state goal in the
redistricting process. We are satisfied that it
is.
The dissenting opinion, at 19, goes a step
further and argues that the Voting Rights Act
itself prohibits any deviation in exact
population equality for the purpose of
complying with the Voting Rights Act. No
court has so held, and we note that plaintiffs
themselves have alleged that the Arizona
redistricting plan violates the Equal
Protection Clause, not that it violates the
Voting Rights Act. We do not read the Act in
the same way that the dissenting opinion
does.
Plaintiffs also argue that the Department of
Justice does not purport to be able to force
jurisdictions to depopulate districts to comply
with Section 5. In a document entitled
“Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,” the
Department
advises:
“Preventing
retrogression under Section 5 does not
require jurisdictions to violate the oneperson, one-vote principle.” But the
Guidance goes on to make clear that, in the
Department’s view, Section 5 might in some
cases require minor population deviations in
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state legislative plans. When a jurisdiction
asserts that it cannot avoid retrogression
because of population shifts, the Department
looks to see whether there are reasonable, less
retrogressive alternatives, as the existence of
these alternatives could disprove the
jurisdiction’s assertion that retrogression is
unavoidable.
For
state
legislative
redistricting, “a plan that would require
significantly greater overall population
deviations is not considered a reasonable
alternative.” The implication is that the
Department would consider a plan with
slightly greater population deviation to be a
reasonable plan that would avoid

unconstitutional. The Court did not hold that
the preclearance requirement of Section 5
was unconstitutional, but its ruling rendered
the preclearance requirement inapplicable to
previously covered jurisdictions, at least until
Congress enacts a new coverage formula that
passes constitutional muster.

retrogression—in
other
words,
the
Department might hold a state in violation of
Section 5 if it could have avoided
retrogression with the aid of minor
population deviations. To be clear, we do not
base our understanding of the law upon the
Department’s interpretation, but plaintiffs
have cited the Department’s Guidance as
supporting its position, and we do not agree.
In our view, the Department’s Guidance
expresses a conclusion that avoiding
retrogression can justify minor population
deviations. That is our conclusion, as well,
based on our own view of the law, separate
and apart from the Department’s position.

But that approach reads too much into Shelby
County. The Court did not hold that Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, the section that
sets out the preclearance process, was
unconstitutional. The Court’s opinion stated
explicitly to the contrary: “We issue no
holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage
formula.” The Court did not hold that
Arizona or any other jurisdiction could not be
required to comply with the preclearance
process, if a proper formula was in place for
determining which jurisdictions are properly
subject to the preclearance process. To the
contrary, the Court’s opinion expressly
faulted Congress for not updating the
coverage formula, implying that a properly
updated coverage formula that “speaks to
current conditions” would withstand
challenge.

This conclusion is not altered by the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Shelby County v.
Holder, which was decided after the
legislative map in question here was drawn
and implemented. In Shelby County, the
Court held that Section 4(b) of the Voting
Rights Act, which contained the formula
determining which states were subject to the
preclearance
requirement,
was

Plaintiffs and the dissenting opinion, at 15–
17, argue that this ruling applies retroactively
to this case, such that the Commission was
not required to obtain preclearance for the
legislative map at issue, thereby nullifying
the pursuit of preclearance as a justification
for population deviations.

If we had before us a challenge to the
coverage formula set forth in Section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act, we would unquestionably
be expected to apply Shelby County
“retroactively,” and we would do so. That is,
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however, not the issue before us. Neither is
the issue before us whether the legislative
map violated or complied with the Voting
Rights Act.
Rather, the issue is whether the Commission
was motivated by compliance with that law
in deviating from the ideal population. In
other contexts, where the issue is not whether
the actions of public officials actually
complied with the law but instead whether
they might have reasonably thought to have
been in compliance, we do not expect those
public officials to predict the future course of
legal developments.
For example, in the qualified immunity
context, the issue is whether the actions of
public officials “could reasonably have been
thought consistent with the rights they are
alleged to have violated.” There, we assess
their actions based on law “clearly
established” at the time their actions were
taken. Similarly, in the Fourth Amendment
context, we decline to apply the exclusionary
rule when a police officer conducts a search
in reasonable reliance on a later invalidated
statute. We generally decline to require the
officer to predict whether the statute will later
be held unconstitutional, unless the statute is
so clearly unconstitutional that a reasonable
officer would have known so at the time.
Arizona was not the only state that drew new
district lines following the 2010 census. The
other states and jurisdictions subject to
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act
engaged in the same exercise. Nothing in
Shelby County suggests that all those maps
are now invalid, and we are aware of no court
that has reached such a conclusion, despite

the concern expressed in the dissenting
opinion, at 15, that leaving the maps in place
“would give continuing force to Section 5.”
To repeat, Shelby County did not hold
Section 5 to be unconstitutional. Neither did
it hold that any effort by a state to comply
with Section 5 was improper.
In redistricting, we should expect states to
comply with federal voting rights law as it
stands at the time rather than attempt to
predict future legal developments and
selectively comply with voting rights law in
accordance
with
their
predictions.
Accordingly, so long as the Commission was
motivated by the requirements of the Voting
Rights Act as it reasonably understood them
at the time, compliance with the Voting
Rights Act served as a legitimate justification
for minor population deviations.
C. Application to 2012 Legislative Map
Plaintiffs argue that Districts 8, 24, and 26
could not have been motivated by
compliance with the Voting Rights Act. They
argue that only eight ability-to-elect districts
existed in the benchmark plan. Because the
Commission had created eight ability-toelect districts even without Districts 8, 24,
and 26, and avoiding retrogression only
requires creating as many ability-to-elect
districts as are in the benchmark plan,
plaintiffs argue that the Voting Rights Act
could not have motivated the creation of
these three districts. In essence, plaintiffs
urge us to determine how many ability-toelect districts were strictly necessary to gain
preclearance and to hold that deviations from
the creation of purported ability-to-elect
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districts above that number cannot be
justified by Voting Rights Act compliance.

their burden to show that there were only
eight.

This argument runs into several problems.
First of all, plaintiffs have not given the court
a basis to independently determine that there
existed only eight ability-to-elect districts in
the benchmark plan. Plaintiffs point to the
fact that the Commission argued that there
were eight benchmark districts in its
submission to the Department of Justice.

In any event, we need not determine whether
the minor population deviations were strictly
necessary to gain preclearance. Plaintiffs
presented testimony from an expert witness,
Thomas Hofeller, to demonstrate that a plan
could have been drawn with smaller
population deviations. Dr. Hofeller prepared
such a map, but he acknowledged that he had
not taken other state interests into account,
including interests clearly identified as
legitimate, nor had he performed a racial
polarization or functional analysis, so that
map did not necessarily present a practical
alternative. Because he concluded, contrary
to the Commission and its counsel and
consultants, that the benchmark number for
minority ability-to-elect districts in the prior
plan was only eight (seven Hispanic districts
and one Native American district), his belief
that his alternative map would have been
precleared by the Justice Department was
disputed. More importantly, evidence that a
map could have been drawn with smaller
population deviations does not prove that
illegitimate criteria motivated the deviations.

But the submission to the Department was an
advocacy document. The Commission was
motivated to make the strongest case for
preclearance by arguing for a low number of
benchmark ability-to-elect districts and a
high number of new ability-to-elect districts.
The Commission’s consultants and counsel,
in public meetings, had advised the
Commission that their analysis suggested the
existence of ten benchmark districts. The
discrepancy between the advice given in
meetings and the arguments put forth in the
submission to the Department of Justice is
not a sufficient basis for the court to conclude
that there were only eight ability-to-elect
districts in the benchmark plan. Moreover,
while plaintiffs criticize elements of the
functional analysis performed by the
Commission’s consultants, plaintiffs have
not provided the court with any functional
analysis of their own or from any other source
showing which districts provided minorities
with the ability to elect in either the
benchmark plan or the current plan that they
challenge. In short, even if we were inclined
to independently determine how many
ability-to-elect districts existed in the
benchmark plan, plaintiffs have not carried

Rather, it is enough that the minor population
deviations are “based on legitimate
considerations.” In other words, we will
invalidate the plan only if the evidence
demonstrates that the deviations were not the
result of reasonable, good-faith efforts to
comply with the Voting Rights Act. We will
not invalidate the plan simply because the
Commission might have been able to adopt a
map that would have precleared with less
population deviation if we determine that in
adopting its map the Commission was
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genuinely motivated by compliance with the
Voting Rights Act.
This approach is in accord both with the
deference federal courts afford to states in
creating their own legislative districts and the
realities of the preclearance process. The
Department of Justice does not inform
jurisdictions of the number of districts
necessary for preclearance ahead of time. Nor
could the Commission be certain which
districts in any tentative plan would be
recognized by the Department as having an
ability to elect. These determinations are
complex and not subject to mathematical
certainty. For us to determine the minimum
number of ability-to-elect districts necessary
to comply with the Voting Rights Act and
then to strike down a plan if minor population
deviations resulted from efforts that we
concluded were not strictly necessary for
compliance would create a very narrow target
for the state. It would also deprive states of
the flexibility to which the Supreme Court’s
one-person, one-vote jurisprudence entitles
them in legislative redistricting
That deviations from perfect population
equality in this case resulted in substantial
part because of the Commission’s pursuit of
preclearance is evidenced both by its
deliberations and by advice given to the
Commission by its counsel and consultants.
Plaintiffs cite Larios v. Cox for the
proposition that advice of counsel is not a
defense to constitutional infirmities in a
redistricting plan. In Larios, state legislators
mistakenly believed that any plan with a
maximum deviation below ten percent was
immune from a one-person, one-vote
challenge and then created a plan with a

maximum deviation of 9.98 percent
deviations in the pursuit of illegitimate
objectives. In holding that the plan violated
the one-person, one-vote principle, the court
held that reliance on faulty legal advice did
not remedy the constitutional infirmity in the
plan. But in Larios, there was no question that
the legislature had pursued illegitimate
policies. The legislature had taken counsel’s
advice to mean that it did not need to have
legitimate reasons for deviating. The court
held that they did need legitimate reasons for
deviating, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Here, by contrast, what motivated the
Commission is at issue. Counsel’s advice
does not insulate the Commission from
liability, but it is probative of the
Commission’s intent. That is not to say that
reliance on the advice of counsel will in all
cases demonstrate the good-faith pursuit of a
legitimate objective. The advice might be so
unreasonable that the Commission could not
reasonably have believed it, or other evidence
may show that the Commission was not
acting pursuant to the advice. But the
Commission’s attorneys gave reasonable
advice as to how to pursue what they
identified as a legitimate objective, and the
Commission appeared to act in accordance
with that advice. That is strong evidence that
the Commission’s actions were indeed in the
pursuit of that objective, one that we have
concluded for ourselves was legitimate.
With respect to the ten districts presented to
the Department of Justice as ability-to-elect
districts, including Districts 24 and 26, the
evidence before us shows that the population
deviations were predominantly based on
legitimate considerations. The Commission
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was advised by its consultants and counsel
that it needed to create at least ten districts.
Given the uncertainty in determining the
number of districts, and that one of the
Commission’s highest priorities was to
preclear the first time, the Commission was
not unreasonable in acting pursuant to this
advice. As noted in our findings of fact, the
target of ten districts was not controversial
and
had
bipartisan
support.
All
commissioners, including the Republican
appointees, believed that ten districts were
appropriate.
A somewhat closer question is presented by
the changes to the district boundaries,
including Districts 24 and 26, made between
the draft map and the final map. The draft
racial polarization analysis prepared by King
and Strasma indicated that minorities would
be able to elect candidates of their choice in
all ten proposed ability-to-elect districts in
the draft map. Plaintiffs argue that no further
changes could be justified by the
Commission’s desire to obtain preclearance
because the draft map met that goal. The
preclearance decision was not going to be
made by King and Strasma, however, and the
Commission could not be sure what it would
take to satisfy the Department of Justice. The
Commission was advised to try to strengthen
the minority ability-to-elect districts even
further, and it was not unreasonable under the
circumstances for the Commission to
undertake that effort. With regard to the ten
ability-to-elect districts, we conclude that
plaintiffs have not carried their burden of
demonstrating that no legitimate motive
caused the deviations or that partisanship
predominated. Creation of these districts was
primarily
a
consequence
of
the

Commission’s good-faith efforts to comply
with the Voting Rights Act and to obtain
preclearance.
District 8 presents an even closer question,
because the evidence clearly shows that
partisanship played some role in its creation.
Commissioner McNulty presented the
possible change to Districts 8 and 11 as an
opportunity to make District 8 into a more
competitive district. We do not doubt that the
creation of competitive districts is a rational,
legitimate state interest. But to justify
population deviations, legitimate state
criteria must be “nondiscriminatory” and
“consistently
applied.”
Commissioner
McNulty’s competitiveness proposal was
neither applied consistently nor in a
nondiscriminatory fashion. It was applied to
improve Democratic prospects in one single
district. It was not applied to districts
favoring Democrats as well as to those
favoring Republicans, so competitiveness
cannot justify the deviation. We have found
that partisanship motivated the Democratic
commissioners to support this change, since
both expressed support for it before there was
any mention of presenting District 8 to the
Department of Justice for the sake of
preclearance.
But while partisanship played some role,
plaintiffs have not carried their burden to
demonstrate that partisanship predominated
over
legitimate
factors.
Because
Commissioner McNulty’s change only
slightly increased the level of population
inequality in District 8 and the other affected
districts, let alone the plan as a whole,
plaintiffs must make a particularly strong
showing to carry their burden. As noted in
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our findings, the changes in population
inequality from draft map to final map that
can be attributed to the vote on
Commissioner McNulty’s proposed change
is an increase of 0.7 percent deviation in
District 8, a decrease of 1.6 percent in District
11, an increase of 2.4 percent in District 12,
and an increase of 1.4 percent in District 16.
Altogether, the change resulted in a small
decrease in deviation in one district and small
increases in deviation in three districts. While
there is some increase in deviation that can be
attributed in part to partisanship, it is not a
particularly large increase.

plaintiffs have not proved that partisanship
predominated over legitimate reasons for the
Commission as a whole.

We have also found that the preclearance
goal played a role in the change to District 8.
Consultants and counsel suggested pursuing
it for the sake of preclearance, and only then
did Chairwoman Mathis endorse the idea.
Without her vote, there would not have been
a majority to adopt that change. In light of the
small deviations resulting from this change
order and because legitimate efforts to
achieve preclearance also drove the decision,

V. Conclusion

We have concluded that compliance with the
Voting Rights Act is a legitimate state policy
that can justify minor population deviations,
that the deviations in the map in large part
resulted from this goal, and that plaintiffs
have failed to show that other, illegitimate
motivations
predominated
over
the
preclearance
motivation.
Therefore,
plaintiffs’ challenge to the map under the
one-person, one-vote principle fails.

We find in favor of the Commission on
plaintiffs’ claim that the Commission’s
legislative redistricting plan violated the oneperson, one-vote principle of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States
Constitution. We order the entry of judgment
for the Commission.

104

“New Arizona Redistricting Case Gets U.S. High Court Review”
Bloomberg
Greg Stohr
June 30, 2015
The U.S. Supreme Court will take up a new
redistricting case from Arizona, agreeing to
decide whether an independent commission
violated the Constitution by watering down
the influence of Republican votes.
The decision to hear the case comes a day
after the court upheld the redistricting
commission against a constitutional
challenge from the state’s Republicancontrolled legislature. The court said voters
could decide to have congressional districts
drawn by the independent panel instead of the
state legislature.
The new case centers on state legislative
districts. A group of Arizona residents say
their votes are being diluted for the sake of
partisan advantage in violation of the
constitutional requirement of “one person,
one vote.”
The commission’s plan “intended to ‘pack’
non-Hispanic white Republican voters in
overpopulated districts to gain an advantage
for the Democrats by overweighting the votes
of Democratic voters in the underpopulated
districts,” the voters, led by Wesley W.
Harris, argued in court papers.

The commission said a three-judge panel
correctly concluded that the population
deviations weren’t driven by partisan
motivations and instead stemmed from an
effort to comply with a provision of the
Voting Rights Act.
That provision, since undercut by a 2013
Supreme Court decision, required federal
preclearance of new districts to protect
minority voting rights.
Voting Rights Act
A desire to comply with the Voting Rights
Act “is a rational state policy capable of
justifying minor deviations in population,”
the commission argued.
The case becomes the second Supreme Court
test of the “one person, one vote” principle
during the nine-month term that starts in
October. The court previously agreed to hear
a Texas case concerning whether states can
allocate legislative seats on the basis of total
population, rather than the number of eligible
voters.
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“Justices Agree to Hear Dispute over Union Fees,
Reapportionment”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
June 30, 2015
[Excerpt; section discussing Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Assoc. omitted]
Arizona reapportionment
The court also will return to the issue of
reapportionment in Arizona, just a day after
validating an independent commission to
which the state’s voters delegated
redistricting powers.
The case says that board, the Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission, did
not properly reapportion the state legislative
districts after the last census.

The use of race and partisanship were
attempts to persuade the Justice Department
to approve the plans under the Voting Rights
Act. But since then, the Supreme Court has
done away with the pre-clearance
requirement.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote
extensively about the new case in his dissent
to the court’s ruling Monday.

On Monday, the Supreme Court upheld the
decision of Arizona voters to create the
commission to draw election districts in an
attempt to reduce partisan gerrymandering.
The court ruled 5 to 4 that cutting the
legislature out of the redistricting process did
not violate the Constitution’s Election
Clause, which says that the times, places and
manner of holding elections “shall be
prescribed in each state by the Legislature
thereof.”

A district court panel ruled that partisanship
played some role in the development of the
legislative district plan but did not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation.

On Tuesday, the court accepted a challenge
brought by a group of Republican voters who
said the commission’s 2012 state legislative
maps violated the “one person, one vote”
requirement of population equality among
districts because GOP voters were shifted to
increase minority voters in others.

The case is Harris v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission.

“A finding that the partisanship in the
redistricting plan did not violate the
Constitution hardly proves that the
commission is operating free of partisan
influence — and certainly not that it complies
with the Elections Clause,” Roberts wrote.
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“Arizona Republicans Lose Legal Challenges to State Voting Map”
Bloomberg Business
Edvard Pettersson
April 29, 2014
Arizona Republican voters lost a challenge to
an electoral districts map for the state
assembly that they said favors Democrats by
putting too many voters in districts with
Republican majorities.

groups to gain an advantage, a practice
known as gerrymandering.
David Cantelme, a lawyer for the plaintiffs,
didn’t immediately respond to a phone call to
his office seeking comment on today’s ruling.

A panel of federal judges voted 2-1 to reject
the argument that the redrawn map by the
state’s
Independent
Redistricting
Commission violated the constitutional rights
of Republican voters to equal protection and
can’t be used in elections.

Arizona Senate

“We conclude that the population deviations
were primarily a result of good-faith efforts
to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and
that even though partisanship played some
role in the design of the map, the Fourteenth
Amendment challenge fails,” according to
the panel’s majority opinion.

Under the redistricting plan completed last
year, 16 of the 17 legislative districts with a
Republican plurality -- more registered
Republican voters than any voters registered
with another party -- exceed the ideal
population of 213,067, plaintiffs said in their
complaint.

The Republican voters, at a trial in Phoenix,
accused the Independent Redistricting
Commission of “a pattern of discriminatory
intent” by concentrating Republicans in
districts that have a higher average
population than other voting districts.

Only two of the districts with a Democratic
plurality exceed the ideal population, they
said.

Redistricting is intended to ensure that
members of the U.S. House of
Representatives and state legislatures
represent roughly equal populations. From
the first Congress, party leaders have
exploited the map-making exercise by
weakening the voting strength of some

Arizona has 30 members in its Senate and 60
members in its House of Representatives.
Each district is represented by one senator
and two house members.

In a dissenting opinion today, U.S. District
Judge Neil Wake said the redistricting
commission “has been coin-clipping the
currency of our democracy, everyone’s equal
vote, and giving all the shavings to one party,
for no valid reason.” The case is Harris v.
Arizona
Independent
Redistricting
Commission, 12-cv-00894, U.S. District
Court, District of Arizona (Phoenix).
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“Supreme Court Upholds Arizona’s Independent Redistricting
Commission”
The Huffington Post
Samantha Lachman
June 29, 2015
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 on Monday that
a voter-approved independent redistricting
commission in Arizona is constitutional. The
conservative wing of the court was in the
minority.
In response to complaints that the state
legislature was engaging in partisan
gerrymandering of congressional districts,
Arizona voters approved an independent
commission to draw district lines in a 2000
ballot initiative. The commission has two
Republicans and two Democrats, who
legislative leaders choose from a list
composed by the state's Commission on
Appellate Court Appointments, in addition to
a chairman who may not be a member of
either party.
Republican legislators sued after the 2012
election, arguing that they shouldn't be
completely cut out of the district-drawing
process.
The case before the Supreme Court -Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission -hinged on one word: "legislature." It arose
out of a debate over the Constitution's
elections clause, which dictates that the
"times, places, and manner" of federal
elections "shall be prescribed in each state by
the legislature thereof."

In oral arguments before the court in early
March, the court's four more conservative
justices, plus Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
the swing vote, seemed skeptical of the
commission's argument that "legislature" can
also mean the legislative process, including
ballot initiatives.
But in its decision, the court's majority,
including Kennedy, wrote that overturning
the independent commission would go
against the spirit of the elections clause.
"The Elections Clause permits the people of
Arizona to provide for redistricting by
independent commission," the decision read.
"The history and purpose of the Clause weigh
heavily against precluding the people of
Arizona from creating a commission
operating independently of the state
legislature to establish congressional
districts. Such preclusion would also run up
against the Constitution’s animating
principle that the people themselves are the
originating source of all the powers of
government."
The decision continued: "The Framers may
not have imagined the modern initiative
process in which the people’s legislative
power is coextensive with the state
legislature’s authority, but the invention of
the initiative was in full harmony with the
Constitution’s conception of the people as the
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font of governmental power. It would thus be
perverse to interpret 'Legislature' in the
Elections Clause to exclude lawmaking by
the people, particularly when such
lawmaking is intended to advance the
prospect that Members of Congress will in
fact be 'chosen... by the People of the several
States.'"
In their dissenting decision, the court's
conservative justices wrote that the majority
was ignoring evidence and "relying instead
on disconnected observations about direct
democracy, a contorted interpretation of an
irrelevant statute, and naked appeals to public
policy."
"Nowhere does the majority explain how a
constitutional
provision
that
vests
redistricting authority in 'the Legislature'
permits a State to wholly exclude 'the
Legislature' from redistricting," the minority
decision continued. "Arizona’s Commission
might be a noble endeavor -- although it does
not seem so 'independent' in practice— but
the 'fact that a given law or procedure is
efficient, convenient, and useful... will not
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.' No
matter how concerned we may be about
partisanship in redistricting, this Court has no
power to gerrymander the Constitution."
The Supreme Court has previously ruled that
“legislature” can refer to legislative power
and the legislative process, as exercised by
the people through direct democracy, since
the Constitution's framers at the time didn't
foresee how initiatives and referenda would
become the law in states like Arizona.

As Justice Elena Kagan pointed out in
March's oral arguments, state legislatures
have previously been cut out of election
administration issues with the advent of
measures to instate voter identification and
mail-in voting, as established by initiatives in
in Mississippi and Oregon, respectively.
"There are zillions of these laws," Kagan
said. "So would all of those be
unconstitutional as well?"
The legislature's attorney, Paul Clement, said
those election laws wouldn't be at risk
because they didn't take power away from the
legislature, as the creation of the Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission did.
Kennedy, who is often key to Supreme Court
decisions, took a different tack during the
oral arguments, noting that U.S. senators
were chosen by state legislatures until 1913,
when a constitutional amendment gave that
power to the people.
"It seems to me that history works very much
against you," Kennedy told the commission's
attorney.
In Monday's ruling, the court's conservative
justices used the example of the amendment
allowing for the election of U.S. senators to
make their point in the dissent that the
independent commission should have been
ruled unconstitutional.
"What chumps!" the minority decision
taunted, saying Arizonans who ratified the
17th Amendment should have realized they
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simply could have interpreted
legislature" to mean "the people."

"the

"The Court today performs just such a magic
trick with the Elections Clause," the dissent
continues. "That Clause vests congressional
redistricting authority in 'the Legislature' of
each State. An Arizona ballot initiative
transferred that authority from 'the
Legislature' to an 'Independent Redistricting
Commission.' The majority approves this
deliberate constitutional evasion by doing
what the proponents of the Seventeenth
Amendment dared not: revising 'the
Legislature' to mean 'the people.' The Court’s
position has no basis in the text, structure, or
history of the Constitution, and it contradicts
precedents from both Congress and this
Court."
Arizona's legislators had initiated no legal
action against the commission until after the
2010 census, when the commission drew four
safe seats for the GOP, two for Democrats
and three toss-up districts -- all of which went
for Democrats in 2012. After that election,
Republicans
began
attacking
the
commission's members as unaccountable to
the people since they are unelected.
Arizona Democrats were thrilled by the
ruling.
“Arizona voters said that they want an open,
transparent and fair redistricting process,
which is why they established the
Independent Redistricting Commission,"
state House Democratic Leader Eric Meyer
said in a statement. "The Supreme Court
decision today protects the will of the voters

and will help prevent partisanship and
political ambition from influencing the
redistricting process. Our state is better
served by having a body, independent of the
Legislature, in charge of this important task.”
The case the Supreme Court heard could have
had potential implications beyond Arizona. If
the justices had ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, the case was expected to overturn
California's commission, since that state had
similarly removed its legislature from the
vast majority of the district-drawing process.
Eleven other states -- Connecticut, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Montana, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio and Washington -also have commissions, though their
lawmakers are more involved in the process.
The court's minority argued there is a "critical
difference" between Arizona, where citizens
"supplanted the legislature altogether," and
other states whose independent commissions
"supplement" the legislature's role. But the
court's majority said a ruling against the
commission would have affected how
elections are conducted in states beyond
Arizona.
"Banning lawmaking by initiative to direct a
State’s method of apportioning congressional
districts would not just stymie attempts to
curb gerrymandering," it wrote. "It would
also cast doubt on numerous other time,
place, and manner regulations governing
federal elections that States have adopted by
the initiative method. As well, it could
endanger election provisions in state
constitutions adopted by conventions and
ratified by voters at the ballot box, without
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involvement
Legislature.'"

or

approval

by

'the

Would-be challengers to the representatives
of Arizona's three competitive congressional
districts -- Democratic Reps. Ann

Kirkpatrick and Kyrsten Sinema and GOP
Rep. Martha McSally -- had held off on
jumping into those races for 2016 until the
Supreme Court issued its decision.
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